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1. INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen a growing trend towards risk management in the aid 
industry (Carter et al. 2008, Kingston and Behn 2010, OECD 2011). This 
growth of “risk talk” (Power 2004) has been driven by three developments: the 
aid effectiveness agenda; the rising incidence of attacks on aid workers 
(Stoddard et al. 2009); and the increasing donor attention to corruption in 
development assistance (Trivunovic et al. 2011).   
Evidence of this shift can be found among donors, UN agencies and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). For instance, in 2010 the Danish 
government hosted a conference, “Results, Risk Assessment and Management 
in Development Cooperation – Towards a Common Approach,” on the 
management of aid risks in fragile states. Other bilateral donors and UN 
agencies (among them, Canada, Sweden, the United Nations Development 
Program and the World Food Program) are also increasingly attracted to risk 
management approaches from the business sector, such as the Enterprise Risk 
Management framework (OECD 2011:68). 
On the NGO side, most organizations have adopted various risk-related 
policies, such as anti-corruption, protection of beneficiaries, employee code of 
conduct, and security. Some organizations, such as Plan and Save the Children, 
have also introduced an overall risk policy, or are in the process of doing so. 
And other NGOs, among them the Norwegian Red Cross, have established 
cooperation agreements with the business sector for competence exchange on 
risk management (Gravlien 2012). Moreover, ten years ago many NGOs did 
not have full-time security advisors; today the majority do (Rowley et al. 
2010).  
Another indicator of the rise of risk management in the aid industry is the 
growing number of publications on risk and its management in humanitarian 
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and development work (e.g. Wilson-Grau 2003, Herman et al. 2004, Bertrand 
and Brown 2006, Grace 2010, Ward and Purdy 2010, Trivunovic et al. 2011).  
Any attempt to manage risks must inevitably begin with the identification of 
risks. Once an organization knows the risks, action can be taken to address 
them (Hubbard 2009:31). The whole risk management endeavor rests on this 
initial step, as it determines which issues will be selected for attention as risks 
and which issues will be taken for granted (Macrae 2007).The word 
“identification” implies that risk is some objective property of the world, just 
waiting to be recognized, quantified, and managed. However, much social 
science analysis has challenged this technical-rationalistic approach, arguing 
that risk is subjective (Slovic 1999) and socially constructed (Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982). 
The body of scholarship referred as “risk perception research” has shown that 
a great many factors influence how people characterize, interpret, and make 
judgments about risks (Urban and Ščasný 2007). These include heuristics and 
probability judgment biases (Tversky and Kahneman 1974); characteristics of 
the risk (Fischoff et al. 1978);  religious and quasi-religious beliefs 
(Kouabenan 1998, Sjöberg and Wahlberg 2002); trust (Flynn et al. 1992, 
Slovic 1999); feelings (Slovic et al. 2004); personality traits (Chauvin 2007); 
cultural dispositions and worldviews (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Douglas 
1985, Rayner 1986); personal experience (Rogers 1997); socio-demographic 
characteristics, such as gender and race (Flynn et al. 1994, Hakes and Viscusi 
2004); mass-media coverage (Freudenburg et al. 1996, Wåhlberg and Sjöberg 
2000); and information retrieval (Liu et al. 1998). Studies of risk perception in 
organizational settings have added further factors to the list, such as 
profession, working environment, functional area, position in the hierarchy, 
and scope of responsibilities (Marek et al. 1985, Rayner 1986, Mearns et al. 
2001, Hutter and Power 2005, Mohammed 2007).   
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Although the identification of risks is neither self-evident nor unproblematic, 
people do make decisions and act based on their perception of risks (Slovic 
and Weber 2002). Therefore, understanding what factors account for those 
perceptions is essential for a more reflexive and critical approach to risk 
management. This is particularly relevant for development and humanitarian 
NGOs. Given the nature of their activities, NGOs rely heavily on the 
judgments of their employees in navigating around a large range of risks – 
such as the risk of causing harm to beneficiaries, risks to the safety and 
security of staff, risks of corruption, risk of reputational loss, or the risk that 
funding might be discontinued (Herman et al. 2004, Metcalfe et al. 2011). 
Thus, investigating how NGO workers interpret and make sense of risks is not 
an issue solely of academic concern, but is of strategic and practical 
importance to NGOs.  
1.1 Objectives and research questions 
The purpose of the study is twofold. The first objective is to develop an 
understanding of the issues framed as risks by employees of an international 
development and humanitarian NGO. This thesis is especially concerned with 
“organizational risks,” that is, risks that directly or indirectly can affect an 
organization, its process, activities and objectives. The second objective is to 
examine where these risk understandings might originate.  
The aims of this study translate into the following research questions: 
1. What do employees identify as a risk for their organization? 
2. How do employees form judgments about organizational risks? 
As mentioned, there are countless points of entry into risk perception research, 
from employees’ personality traits to hierarchical level, passing through 
cultural dispositions, feelings and other factors. Given the impossibility of 
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exploring, in a brief master’s thesis, how these multiple factors interact with 
one another, I decided to investigate perceptions of organizational risk from an 
angle that has received little attention so far. Most studies of risk perception in 
organizational settings (including NGOs) focus on one’s position within the 
organization (e.g. Marek et al. 1985, Rayner 1986, Cox and Flin 1998, 
Pidgeon 1998, Hutter 2001, Mohammed 2007, 2010). In this thesis, I explore 
the possible linkages between perceptions of organizational risk and the 
operating context of development and humanitarian NGOs, or what has 
become known as the “aid industry.” Drawing on the relational theory of risk 
(Boholm and Corvellec 2011) and new institutionalism in organizational 
analysis (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), I investigate how rules, laws, belief 
systems, conventions, and paradigms widespread in the aid industry influence 
what issues are framed as organizational risks by employees. This in turn 
means that I provide only a partial explanation for the second research 
question. 
1.2 Methodological approach 
This thesis consists of a single case study, Save the Children Norway (in 
Norwegian: Redd Barna), hereafter referred to as SCN. Founded in 1946, SCN 
is an international non-governmental organization (INGO) based in Oslo. One 
of the largest INGOs in the country, SCN works to promote children’s rights 
and improve the living conditions of vulnerable children through long-term 
development and humanitarian aid. Undoubtedly, SCN provides a rich setting 
for a variety of research topics. Given the objectives this study, however, the 
organization was selected because of research access considerations rather 
than its intrinsic uniqueness. 
The case-study method was considered the most appropriated approach for 
investigating NGO workers’ perceptions of risk, given the focus on 
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organizational risks rather than risks to employees themselves. Since this topic 
remains barely examined, an open-ended and inductive approach was adopted. 
A broad set of questions was used during data collection, rather than one final 
research problem or hypothesis (Yin 2003a,b). As an exploratory study, this 
thesis cannot produce more than leads, directions, and hypotheses for further 
inquiry. Therefore, the findings presented in this study cannot and should not 
be generalized to SCN as a whole.   
This study is ontologically and epistemologically grounded on a social-cultural 
perspective on risk  (e.g. Lupton and Tulloch 2002a,b, Tulloch and Lupton 
2003, Bickerstaff 2004). Rejecting the view of risk as an objective entity, this 
approach posits that risk is the product of human judgment; hence, risk 
understandings are inevitably shaped by social processes as well as individual 
experience (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006, Zinn 2006). In other words, risk is 
not “out there”; like beauty, it lies in the eyes of the beholder (Dafel and 
Jackson 2000:2).  
A socio-cultural perspective calls for a qualitative research approach which 
can allow scholars to explore how risk understandings are constructed in the 
actual context where people encounter and make judgments about risk.  Two 
qualitative data collection techniques were employed: in-depth semi-structure 
interviews, and document analysis. The analysis presented in the following 
chapters is based primarily on the interview material. In all, 16 interviews were 
conducted face-to-face at SCN's head office in Oslo, six through Skype and 
one by email. This allowed me to reach employees in four countries, which 
would have otherwise been impossible due to time and funding constraints.  
Given the exploratory nature of this study, my goal was to interview a 
heterogeneous group of employees, in terms of work location, functional area, 
and hierarchy level. However, a maximum variation sampling strategy was 
only partially successful, due to problems of access.  In total, 23 employees 
participated in this study: 11 from SCN’s head office in Oslo; one each from 
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Save the Children International and Save the Children Denmark; and 10 
employees from local offices in in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nepal, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Russia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Fieldwork was conducted in 
Norway between August 31 and November 22, 2011. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This study consists of seven chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 
reviews the relevant literature on risk perception and presents the theoretical 
framework employed. Chapter 3 provides an overview of SCN as of December 
2011, in order to familiarize the reader with the case organization, setting the 
stage for the study of perceptions of organizational risk. Chapter 4 describes 
how the study was conducted and the rationale underlying the choice of 
research methods. Chapter 5 draws on the relational theory of risk (Boholm 
and Corvellec 2011) to present and analyze the organizational risks identified 
by SCN staff. The focus is on the first research question: What do employees 
identify as a risk for their organization? Chapter 6 discusses the research 
findings in the light of the literature. Drawing on the relational theory of risk 
and the new institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), it also provides a 
partial explanation of how employees form judgments about organizational 
risks. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis, discusses some implications 
for theory and offers recommendations for further research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK  
This chapter reviews the literature and presents the theories used to interpret 
perceptions of organizational risk among SCN staff. The first section 
introduces the phenomenon of risk perception and surveys relevant literature 
on risk perception in organizational settings, including NGOs. The second 
section outlines the theoretical framework used in this study.  
2.1 Risk perception  
Starting with Chauncey Starr’s (1969) seminal work on risk acceptance and 
voluntariness (Sjöberg 2000:1), risk perception research investigates how 
people form judgments about risks (Wilkinson 2001). This body of scholarship 
emerged as a rejection of the view of risk as an objective property of natural 
events or human activities (Slovic and Weber 2002).  According to Slovic et 
al. (1982:83), studies on risk perception have three main objectives:  
(i) to discover what people mean when they say that something is (or is 
not) ‘risky’, and to determine what factors underlie those perceptions, 
(ii) to develop a theory of risk perception that predicts how people will 
respond to new hazards and management strategies (…), and (iii) to 
develop techniques for assessing the complex and subtle opinions that 
people have about risk.  
Nevertheless, risk perception means different things to different researchers. 
The term has been used to describe “attitudes, beliefs, feelings, and cognitions 
about risk” (Coleman 1993:612-613). This reflects the multidisciplinary nature 
of risk perception scholarship and researchers’ disagreement as to how to 
define the concept of risk itself (Renn 1998, Aven 2011). 
Originally established by psychologists in the 1970s (Bickerstaff 2004:827), 
the study of risk perception has gradually involved contributors from the fields 
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of sociology, anthropology, and geography (Bickerstaff 2004:827). The two 
dominant theories come from distinct disciplines (Krimsky 1992, Sjöberg et al. 
2004): the psychometric paradigm (Fischoff et al. 1978), which is rooted in 
psychology and decision theory; and cultural theory (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1982, Douglas 1985, 1992), which is grounded in anthropology and 
sociology.
1
  
The psychometric paradigm investigates the individual cognitive processes 
involved in how people form subjective judgments about risk. According to 
Oltedal et al. (2004), the basic assumption is that people evaluate the risk 
associated with a given activity or technology (nuclear power, driving a car, 
smoking, diagnostic X-rays, etc.) based on the characteristics they attribute to 
the issue in question (controllable or incontrollable; voluntary or involuntary; 
effect delayed or immediate; etc.). Psychometric studies generally use 
quantitative techniques, such as questionnaires, psychological rating scales and 
statistical methods (Slovic 1992). Participants are first asked to identify the 
characteristic of a list of activities or technologies, and then to evaluate their 
perceived riskiness (ibid.). Activities, technologies, and characteristics to be 
tested are all pre-selected by researchers. Despite its cognitive emphasis, the 
psychometric paradigm has gradually opened up for social and cultural 
determinants of risk perception (see Peters and Slovic 1996, Slovic and Peters 
1998). 
Developed as a critique to the psychometric approach (Boholm 2008:9), 
cultural theory focuses on the role of group membership and social context in 
shaping what issues are regarded as risks. For cultural theorists, risk is not the 
product of individual cognition, but a social construct subject to social 
structure, institutions, values, and belief systems (Douglas and Wildavsky 
                                              
1
 Other less famous theories include simplified conjoint expected risk (SCER) (Holtgrave and Weber 
1993), the social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al. 1988) and the basic risk perception model 
(BRPM) (Sjöberg 1993). 
 9 
Source: Oltedal et al. (2004:19) 
1982). The basic assumption is that risk reflects what people understand as a 
threat to their social group (Rayner 1986). Consequently, members of social 
groups that have different convictions and perceptions of reality — or 
“worldviews” — will single out different issues for attention as risks (Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982:8).  
Researchers have identified four main types of worldviews:
2
 the individualist, 
which sees threats to individual freedom as a risk; the egalitarian, which is 
concerned with issues that could lead to greater inequality; the hierarchical, 
which fears what could jeopardize order in society; and the fatalistic 
worldview, which is either unaware of risks or assumes them to be inevitable 
(Oltedal et al. 2004:19-21). These worldviews derive from Douglas’ (1978) 
grid and group analytical framework  (see Figure 1). In this schema, “grid” 
refers to the extent to which 
individuals accept structural 
constraints such as hierarchy 
and  procedural regulation, 
whereas “group” expresses the 
degree of group cohesiveness 
(Renn 1998:61). These 
prototypes, however, should be 
seen as an analytic device rather 
than a definitive explanation 
(Aven and Renn 2010). 
2.1.1 Risk perception in organizations 
From a societal perspective, organizations play an essential role in the 
production, assessment, and management of risks in modern life (Clarke and 
                                              
2
 Thompson et al. (1990) describe a fifth, the hermit, which is a hybrid version of the other four. 
Figure 1: Douglas’ grid and group 
framework 
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Short 1993, Hutter and Power 2005). They influence public debates on risk 
(Clarke and Short 1993) and manage risks that have large societal implications 
if things go wrong – take, for instance, the consequences of BP’s oil spill in 
the Gulf of Mexico or the Fukushima nuclear disaster. From an organizational 
perspective, the management of risks is an inherent feature of organizations. 
Directly or indirectly, all management functions and processes play a role in 
safeguarding the organization from risk and uncertainty (Hutter and Power 
2005). Organizations themselves are becoming increasingly aware of their risk 
exposure, as attested by the growing popularity of risk management 
frameworks (Power 2004, 2009). Nevertheless, the topic of risk and 
organizations remains largely unexplored by scholars (Jaeger et al. 2001:165-
166). This is also the case with risk perception research. According to Chess 
(2001:186), studies have traditionally focused “on the perceptions of lay 
people rather than that of managers of corporations.”  
However, it would be premature to conclude that we know very little about 
risk perception in organizational settings. There is a growing body of empirical 
research and some theoretical approaches, which can be roughly grouped into 
two categories. The first consists of studies in which the organization is treated 
as the context where humans encounter risks to themselves. This includes, for 
instance, studies on accidents and disasters  (e.g. Turner 1976, Perrow 1984, 
Vaughan 1996) and employees’ perspectives on occupational safety and health 
risks  (e.g. Marek et al. 1985, Hutter 2001). In the second category are studies 
in which the organization itself is seen as exposed to risk. This involves, for 
instance, studies on managerial risk-taking (e.g. MacCrimmon et al. 1986, 
March and Shapira 1987) and risk perception and management in NGOs (e.g. 
Mohammed 2007, 2010). I will use the term ‘organizational risk’ to refer to 
risks which directly or indirectly affect an organization’s processes, activities, 
and objectives.  
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In the following, I briefly review some empirical findings from studies on 
occupational safety and health and organizational risk perception in NGOs. In 
addition, I present the practice-immanent view of risk (Corvellec 2010), a 
theoretical explanation for how organizational conceptions of risk are formed.   
Occupational health and safety  
Research on occupational health and safety has revealed that different 
perspectives on risk and safety may exist within one and the same 
organization. Although a few risks might be commonly understood, there are 
various “safety cultures” (Cox and Flin 1998, Pidgeon 1998) or “worlds of 
risk” (Marek et al. 1985) within organizations. These studies have 
demonstrated that perceptions of risk are patterned according to one’s location 
within the organization (Rayner 1986, Hutter and Power 2005), which suggests 
that different workings contexts give rise to different risk understandings. For 
instance, Hunter (2001) reported that perceptions of occupational health and 
safety risks among British Rail employees were consistent with their place in 
the organization’s hierarchy. In interviews, only respondents in leadership 
positions mentioned occupational health risks, such as deafness due to 
prolonged exposure to noise. The rest of the staff focused on occupational 
safety risks such as accidents. 
As noted by Mearns et al. (2001), researchers have identified various other 
factors that account for the existence of differing risk understandings within an 
organization. These include demographic factors (age, sex, prior professional 
experiences, profession, occupation, etc.) and situational factors (working 
environment, production pressure and peers’ influence, etc.). For instance, 
Marek et al. (1985) investigated risk understandings of four occupational 
groups working on an oil platform in Norway: administrative staff, catering 
staff, hotel crew, and drillers. The study found that each group perceived risks 
differently, and that these variations were patterned according to four factors: 
overall knowledge about operations on an oil platform; current working 
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conditions and tasks; previous working experiences; and the system of 
organizational and administrative processes on the platform (Mearns et al. 
2001).  
Organizational risk perception and NGOs 
To my knowledge, the only published study on organizational risk perception 
in NGOs has been carried out by Kassim M. Mohammed (2007, 2010). 
Seeking to demonstrate the connection between risk perception and risk 
management, Mohammed investigated perceptions of organizational risk 
among employees of MASH Trust. Based in New Zealand, the organization 
provides healthcare and support for people with mental, intellectual, and 
physical disabilities.  Rather than focusing on risks to the employees 
themselves, Mohammed examined what employees perceived as a risk for 
their organization and what strategies they used in managing those risks. The 
organization was not only the context, but also the object of perception. 
The study involved interviewing 34 employees from different areas and 
organizational levels. Participants were grouped into three categories 
according to their hierarchal level: governance (CEO and other top 
management), managerial (middle management) and staff (employees working 
directly with clients). Interviewees identified over 35 different types and 
sources of risk, including risk of reputation loss; risk of lack of financial 
resource due to reduced number of funders; risk of failure to recruit or retain 
staff; risk of breeching accreditation or certification standards; risk of 
inappropriate conduct of employees towards clients; and the risk of clients 
harming employees.  
Observing that variations were more pronounced between groups than within 
each group, Mohammed argued that perceptions of risk were patterned 
according to two dimensions: the vertical, which relates to the group position 
in the organizational hierarchy and scope of responsibilities (top management, 
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middle management, and workforce); and the horizontal, which refers to 
participants’ functional area (finance, human resources, etc.). For instance, the 
governance group described risks that could affect the entire organization, 
whereas the staff group focused on risks directly related to handling clients, 
and the managerial group was somewhere in-between these two perspectives. 
Mohammed then concluded that working context is a key determinant of risk 
perception. Put differently, employees’ judgments about risk are informed by 
their place within the organization, especially in terms of hierarchy and 
functions. 
Despite its original contribution, the study has two important weaknesses. 
First, Mohammed’s analysis neither acknowledges nor takes into account 
external factors that could influence employee perceptions of organizational 
risk. On the contrary, the reader is left with the impression that MASH Trust is 
a closed system that operates in isolation from its surroundings – even though 
some risks identified by the respondents derived from the organization’s 
interactions with external stakeholders, such as clients, funders or accreditation 
bodies. Second, Mohammed concludes that working context shapes risk 
understandings, but he treats MASH Trust’s organizational context as a self-
evident reality, never questioning why the organization is structured and 
operates the way it does. If risk perception is a context-dependent 
phenomenon, risk perception research cannot take context for granted. I offer a 
broader discussion on these limitations in Chapter 6, in analyzing my own 
research findings. 
A practice-immanent view of organizational risk  
Based on a case study of Skånetrafiken, a regional public transportation 
authority in Sweden, Corvellec (2010) offers  a theoretical explanation of how 
perceptions of organizational risk are constructed. His analysis builds on 
practice theory (Nicolini et al. 2003, Gherardi 2009) and the assertion that 
there is no risk unless something valuable is at stake (Rescher 1983, Rosa 
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1998, Aven and Renn 2009). Corvellec suggests that managerial practice 
determines what is valuable for an organization, and consequently influences 
what issues are singled out as risks.  
For three years, Corvellec investigated risk understandings and risk 
management practices in Skånetrafiken. The organization provides public 
transportation services through train and bus contractors in the Skåne region of 
southern Sweden. Corvellec noticed that managers often mentioned potential 
threats to the Skånetrafiken’s brand and reputation when asked to identify 
risks. That coincided with the fact that the organization had in recent years 
been focusing increasingly on establishing a brand name for itself. Corvellec 
concluded that managers constructed a series of reputational risks because they 
believed the brand was essential to the operational model, success, and 
business continuity of the organization. In other words, the brand was seen to 
be at risk precisely because it was considered important and worth protecting. 
“Risk is born in the process of attaching value to some object (and not to 
others)” (2010:147). Had the brand been deemed unimportant, managers 
would have focused on other risks.  
Recognizing that value is never self-evident, Corvellec draws on practice 
theory to propose that managerial practices influenced what managers 
considered valuable for Skånetrafiken. “Practice” is here understood as the 
explicit or implicit ways of organizing and running the organization– routines, 
procedures, mental schemes, preferences, rules, etc. (2009:298). Corvellec 
proposes that conceptions of value derive from managerial practice, as it 
establishes what managers should focus on. Put differently, specific ways of 
organizing give rise to specific ways of valuing things. In the case of 
Skånetrafiken, managers attached particular value to the brand because the 
organization operates exclusively via contractors. Due to this operational 
model, managers had developed an understanding that what Skånetrafiken 
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needed was a visible brand to unify its transport operators in the public eye, 
and increase business. 
Given that practice determines value and value shapes risk, Corvellec 
concludes that organizational risk understandings are contingent on managerial 
practice.   Schematically, [practice] → [value] → [risk]. That is to say, “risk 
emerges from the political, strategic, and managerial choices that are made, 
explicitly or not, about how to run the organization” (2010:147).  Therefore, if 
Skånetrafiken had a different operational model, other objects would be seen 
as valuable, and managers would have perceived other risks. 
Despite its innovative approach, Corvellec’s practice-immanent view of risk 
has three main shortcomings.  First, the analysis highlights the role of value in 
risk assessments, but downplays the role of danger. It is not clear why 
managers saw certain objects
3
 as a source of danger to Skånetrafiken’s brand, 
but not others. Second, Corvellec bases his entire argument on the concept of 
practice, without discussing what shapes managerial practice. Third, like 
Mohammed (2007, 2010), Corvellec does not incorporate the organization’s 
operating context into his analysis. In Chapter 6, I discuss these limitations, 
based on the case study of SCN. 
2.2 Theoretical framework  
In setting out on this study, I considered the applicability of dominant theories 
on risk perception to understand how employees of SCN form judgments about 
organizational risk. However, I found that neither the psychometric paradigm 
nor the cultural theory helped in answering the research questions.  
                                              
3
 E.g. overcrowded trains, violence, accidents, delays, poor service performances by contracted 
personnel. 
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The psychometric paradigm does not offer a methodological approach that 
takes into account the situational determinants of risk perception identified in 
the literature. Psychometric studies tend to treat research subjects as atomized 
individuals, paying little attention to socio-demographic data about sample 
groups, which may influence perception (Cutter 1993, Lupton 1999 cited in 
Wilkinson 2001). Moreover, perceptions of risk captured through 
questionnaires in controlled settings are necessarily disconnected from the 
social context (Wilkinson 2001). In addition, psychometric studies do not 
investigate what participants identify as being at stake (e.g. themselves, their 
families, the general public), offering a limited picture of risk perception 
(Sjöberg et al. 2004).  Finally, using a list of risk issues pre-selected by the 
researcher could constrain the scope of discussion (Smallman and Smith 
2003).  
Cultural theory, on the other hand, does provides an analytical framework for 
mapping variations in risk perception, and places emphasis on the social 
context. I entertained the possibility of using Douglas’ (1978) grid and group 
framework. However, it soon became clear that the framework could not 
describe what I was seeing in the data. I could argue that SCN is mix of 
different worldviews, as cultural theory posits (PERRI 2005:100). But that 
would not help me to understand why there seemed to be underlying 
commonalities among apparently distinct examples of risks.  
Therefore, to be able to interpret and understand perceptions of organizational 
risk among SCN’s employees, I developed a theoretical framework which 
combines new institutionalism  (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983) and the relational theory of risk (Boholm and Corvellec 2011). 
The relational theory of risk informs the notion of risk underlying this study 
and serves as a framework for “reverse engineering” examples of risks 
provided by respondents, revealing the constitutive elements. New 
institutionalism helps to put the risk issues identified by SCN staff into the 
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context of a larger system and enables me to investigate how rules, laws, belief 
systems, conventions, and paradigms widespread in the aid industry influence 
what issues are framed as organizational risks by respondents. 
2.2.1 Defining risk 
Attempts to study risk perception must inevitably face the question: “What is 
risk?” (Slovic 1999).Unfortunately, there is no simple answer. “Risk” is an 
elusive and much contested term (Power 2004:13) used to convey a wide range 
of meanings in everyday parlance. Risk is the possibility of future loss or 
harm. Risk is a danger or a problem. Risk is an opportunity. Risk is something 
that you take. Risk is something you are exposed to. Also in the academic 
world, there is no generally accepted definition (Renn 1998, Breakwell 2007, 
Aven 2011). Researchers debate the very nature of risk and how it should be 
studied. To simplify a complex discussion, we may say there are three main 
competing ontological and epistemological perspectives on risk. First, risk is a 
property of the material world, which can be measured with probability theory 
and managed. Second, risk is the product of individual intrapsychic processes, 
which can be investigated through psychological rating scales and statistical 
methods. Finally, risk is a social construct, subject to context, social structure, 
values, and belief systems (for a detailed review see Bradbury 1989, Shrader-
Frechette 1991, Rosa 1998, Renn 2008a,b, Hansson 2010).   
In this study I will use the definition of risk proposed by Åsa Boholm and 
Hervé Corvellec (2011) in the relational theory of risk, which falls under the 
third ontological and epistemological perspective above. It provides a useful 
framework for deconstructing risk issues and examining how risk 
understandings are constructed. In what follows, I offer a summary of the key 
tenets and analytical concepts of this theory of risk. 
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The relational theory of risk 
The relational theory of risk was outlined by Åsa Boholm and Hervé Corvellec 
in an article published in 2011. However, some key concepts had been 
discussed in the context of the NRCER project
4
 or presented in earlier works 
(see Boholm 2003, 2008, Corvellec 2010). The theory can be described as an 
interpretative approach to risk, aimed at explaining “why and how something 
is considered a risk” (2011:176). It is grounded in three converging theoretical 
approaches: the concept of risk object, first mentioned by Hilgartner (1992) 
and further developed by Kendra (2007); the role of value in risk assessments, 
as suggested by Rescher (1983) and Rosa (1998);  and the understanding of 
risk as culturally situated, originally proposed by Douglas (1985). The 
relational theory of risk defines risk as 
[the] product of situated cognition that establishes a causal and 
contingent relationship of risk between a risk object and an object at 
risk so that the risk object is considered, in some way and under certain 
circumstances, to threaten the value attached to the object at risk. 
(2011:186). 
In simplified terms, when people think or talk about risk they do so by 
constructing causal and hypothetical relationships between objects. Although 
the objects involved vary, the same pattern consistently appears: the object “A” 
(source of harm) could affect negatively the object “B” (something worth 
protecting). Assume, for instance, that there is a risk that smoking could cause 
lung cancer. In this example, a relationship is established between smoking 
(risk object) and the one’s health conditions (object at risk), in which smoking 
could cause a life-threatening disease.  
Like other social constructionist approaches (see Douglas and Wildavsky 
1982, Douglas 1985, Hilgartner 1992, Dean 1999, Jasanoff 1999, Lupton 
                                              
4
 Carried out between 2000 and 2001, the Network for Research into the Construction of 
Environmental Risk (NRCER) involved researchers from the universities of Bordeaux-2, Gothenburg, 
Lancaster, Naples, and Saragossa who all had been studying the social construction of  environmental 
risks. 
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1999) the relational theory of risk rejects the view of risk as an objective 
reality, independent of the perceiver. Instead, the theory emphasizes the 
importance of context, social structure, values, and belief systems in shaping 
how people perceive and respond to risks. But what exactly does it mean to say 
something is “socially constructed”? According to Boghossian (2001:1) it 
means  
to emphasize its dependence on contingent aspects of our social selves. 
It is to say: This thing could not have existed had we not built it; and we 
need not have built it at all, at least not in its present form. Had we been 
a different kind of society, had we had different needs, values, or 
interests, we might well have built a different kind of thing, or built this 
one differently.  
Therefore, to say that risk is socially constructed is to acknowledge that risk 
understandings are not self-evident, but the product of social forces. For 
instance, think about the risk that changes in Earth’s climate triggered by 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions could disrupt human societies. If risk 
were an objective reality waiting ‘out there’ to be identified, climate skeptics 
should have been convinced by now, given the amount of scientific evidence 
available. And yet, climate change remains a highly contested topic, due not 
least to politics and economic interests.   
Another essential element of relational theory of risk is the assertion that risk 
arises from “situated cognition” (Boholm and Corvellec 2011). This socially 
situated view of risk builds on two ideas. First, the construction of some 
objects as dangerous and others as valuable reflects the fact that humans make 
sense of the world by creating categories of objects, beings, places, etc. 
(Lakoff 1987). This is a dynamic process in which various sources provide 
continuous feedback, such as personal experiences, second-hand information, 
science, tradition, and common knowledge (Boholm and Corvellec 2011:185-
186). Second, cognition does not take place in a social and cultural vacuum; it 
is contingent on practical life (Mol 2002). Therefore, understandings of risk 
cannot be separated from social practices, cultural representations, and the 
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dynamics of the contexts in which they are created. Risk is a context-
dependent phenomenon (Slovic 2000). 
The relational theory of risk has three key analytical components: the risk 
object, the object at risk, and the relationship of risk. As to the first: Risk 
objects are identified as sources of potential harm and danger, similar to 
hazards. These objects, however, do not have an objective existence: they are 
constructed, in the sense that portraying something as ‘risky’ involves stressing 
certain features of the object, while downplaying others. For this reason, nearly 
everything can be singled out as a risk object: physical objects, natural 
phenomena, cultural representations, human behaviors, etc. On the other hand, 
this construction process is not arbitrary. Pre-existent natural and social 
conditions shape what is or not defined as dangerous. Given their socially 
constructed nature, risk objects are always open to reinterpretation. Their 
identity is not fixed. What constitutes a risk object in one context might not be 
perceived as such in another. What constitutes a risk object for one person 
might be perceived as an object at risk by another.  
Objects at risk are invested with value, understood here as the relative worth or 
importance of something. Like risk objects, objects at risk are not self-evident 
or natural, but socially created. This, implicitly or explicitly, involves a 
valuation process. Views on what is deemed of value vary widely, so different 
material and immaterial artifacts can be constructed as objects at risk: human 
lives, nature, money, freedom, reputation, etc. Objects at risk are continuously 
being redefined, as what is valuable today may not be valuable tomorrow. 
Objects at risk are an essential element for understanding why and how 
relationships of risk are formed, since “there is no risk unless something of 
value is considered to be at stake” (Corvellec 2010:145). 
And thirdly, a relationship of risk is the connection between a risk object and 
an object at risk, in which the former could harm or affect negatively the latter. 
The relationship of risk is also a construct: it is not self-evident that the risk 
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object “A” has the potential to harm, or is going to harm, the object at risk 
“B”. The relationship is created by the observer, shaped by his or her past 
experiences, viewpoints, interests, and worries. It reflects how that observer 
understands the risk object and the object at risk. A relationship of risk can be 
established by means of probabilities and scientific experiments, or by less 
sophisticated approaches such as narratives. Therefore, Boholm and Corvellec 
(2011) suggest that despite using different methods, both experts and lay 
people construct relationships of risk.  
Although these authors take a constructionist approach to risk, they emphasize 
that relationships of risk are not random. At least three conditions must be met. 
Firstly, relationships of risk are essentially hypothetical: there must a 
possibility that the risk object “A” could affect the object at risk “B”, but that 
event may or may not happen. Secondly, relationships of risk are causal: a 
cause–effect connection must be established between two objects, in which the 
risk object “A” is perceived as having a particular effect on the object at risk 
“B” that will take place under certain circumstances. This causal link 
subsumes an understanding of who is to be blamed for the undesirable 
outcome  (Douglas 1992).  And thirdly, relationships of risk are linked or lead 
to action, as risk itself embodies the desire to act in the face of uncertainty 
(Bernstein 1996).  
To illustrate their argument, Boholm and Corvellec (2011) provide a simple 
example (see Figure 2): the risk that a dog could break into a children’s 
playground and harm a child (No.1).  In this case, the dog is constructed as a 
risk object, embodying a potential source of danger, while the child is 
constructed as the valuable object at risk, whose life and well-being is worth 
protecting. However, given the fluid identity of risk objects and objects at risk  
(Bauman 2005), two other interpretations are possible. First, the dog owner is 
the primary risk object, since he or she should have ensured the dog was 
trained to avoid inflicting harm (No. 2).  Second, a negligent owner is a 
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potential source of harm for the dog itself, from an animal rights perspective 
(No.3). We see that different relationships of risk can be constructed involving 
dog, child, and dog owner.  
Figure 2: Risk as a relationship 
 
Source: adapted from Boholm and Corvellec (2011)  
This example also illustrates that three components of the relational theory of 
risk (risk object, object at risk, and relationship of risk) are constructed at the 
same time. In other words, dog, child, or dog owner are not intrinsically risk 
objects or objects at risk: they are given their roles in the play at the same time 
as the plot is conceived. Therefore, “(…) any single phenomenon can 
simultaneously be regarded as a risk object, as an object at risk, or as having 
nothing to do with risk, by observers operating under different assumptions” 
(Boholm and Corvellec 2011:179). 
2.2.2 Understanding organizations 
Researching organizational risk perception requires a theory-based 
understanding of organizational structure and behavior. This thesis draws on 
the analytical lenses of the so-called “new institutionalism in organizational 
analysis”, hereafter referred as new institutional theory or new institutionalism 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991).This theory was selected for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the emphasis of new institutionalism on relations between 
organizations and their environment allows researchers to take the analysis 
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from the micro to the macro level. This is particularly relevant for the 
objectives of this study, since earlier work on organizational risk perception in 
NGOs has focused primarily on situational factors (Mohammed 2007, 2010). 
Secondly, some researchers have suggested that new institutional theory could 
advance our understanding of risk in organizations (Lane and Quack 1999, 
Power 2004, 2009, Lim 2012). Lane and Quack (1999), for instance, have 
shown how state policies and institutionalized norms accounted for differences 
in risk taking and risk management in German and British banks. In the 
following, I provide an overview of new institutionalism, and its application to 
NGOs. 
New institutionalism 
Formulated by Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977), DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983), and Meyer and Scott (1983), the new institutionalism posits 
that organizations are deeply embedded in wider societal contexts— or 
“organizational fields”— which influence their structure and behavior 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Based on Bourdieu (Powell 2007), the concept 
of organizational field describes a community of various social actors united 
around a central issue – oil and gas, international development cooperation, 
renewable energy, etc. These actors may include suppliers, consumers, 
professional associations, consultants, regulatory agencies, competitors, and 
others (Krücken and Hasse 2007, Powell 2007). However, organizational 
fields are more than just a cluster of organizations. They are “socially 
constructed normative world[s]” (Lister 2003:178), with their own rules, laws, 
belief systems, mental models, conventions, rational myths
5
, and paradigms 
(Suchman 1995). 
                                              
5
 Myths of “best practice,” which are based on the assumption that they are rationally effective (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977) 
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Another central concept in new institutional theory is legitimacy (Deephouse 
and Suchman 2008). Highlighting its socially constructed nature, Suchman 
(1995:574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within (…)[the] 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions [of a social group].” This aura 
of propriety and credibility allows organizations to say what they say and do 
what they do (Edwards 1999 cited in Kuroda and Imata 2003:1-2). Legitimacy 
helps organizations to improve access to scarce resources, secure support from 
their constituencies, enhance stability, and increase chances of success and 
survival (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Suchman 1995, Deephouse and Suchman 
2008).  
An organization can actively seek the endorsement of other field-members 
(Suchman 1995), but its legitimacy (or lack thereof) will depend on how these 
stakeholders perceive the organization (Deephouse and Carter 2005). 
Consequently, the more an organization depends on the active and long-term 
engagement of its stakeholders, the higher its need for legitimacy (DiMaggio 
1988 cited in Suchman 1995). In this sense, legitimacy resembles the concept 
of reputation, as both involve an external evaluation of the organization 
(Ashforth and Gibbs 1990, Fombrun and Shanley 1990). According to 
Deephouse and Carter (2005), several authors have noted the conceptual 
overlapping between these concepts (e.g. Ashforth and Gibbs 1990, Fombrun 
and Shanley 1990, Galaskiewicz 1985, Oliver 1990, Stuart 2000, Hall 1992, 
Suchman 1995).  For instance, both reputation and legitimacy improve an 
organization’s access to external resources (Hall 1992, Suchman 1995). 
Moreover, they have similar “sources,” such as regulatory compliance and 
charitable giving (Oliver 1990, Stuart 2000). In this thesis, reputation and 
legitimacy are treated as synonyms. 
According to Suchman (1995:587), organizations can adopt three different 
types of legitimacy-seeking strategies: they may conform to legitimating 
criteria in their field; change the rules of the game; or seek another field.  
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However, Suchman argues that managers often see conformity as the easiest 
approach. As a result, the pursuit of legitimacy is a driving force behind 
organizational structure and behavior (Nee 2003). To be endorsed by their 
field-members (Deephouse 1996), organizations tend to incorporate structures 
and practices to conform to the rules of the game (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
This process, called “isomorphism”, explains why organizations in certain 
industries become increasingly similar over time (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
Although isomorphism builds legitimacy, it also creates problems for 
organizations. They may, for instance, adopt practices or procedures that are 
counter-productive. This often leads to a gap between formal structure and 
practices, known as “decoupling” (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Additionally, 
there may be conflicting rules, laws, conventions and paradigms within a 
single organizational field, depending on the number of stakeholder groups 
involved. In this case, organizations may be forced to adopt incompatible 
practices, as they seek the endorsement of different social actors (Liu 
2011:146). Since legitimacy is established per stakeholder group (Deephouse 
1996, Lister 2003, Lim 2012), securing the support of one group may even 
jeopardize the organization’s legitimacy with another (Lim 2012).  
Organizations face not only multiple legitimating audiences, but multiple 
legitimacy criteria. Researchers have identified several dimensions of 
legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol 1994, Stryker 1994, Scott 1995, Suchman 1995). 
The typology proposed by W. Richard Scott (1995) is particularly relevant for 
the purposes of this study. He identifies three types of legitimacy: regulatory, 
normative, and cognitive. Regulatory legitimacy is concerned with laws and 
norms imposed upon the organization, as well as self-regulatory mechanisms. 
This dimension is mostly associated with third parties, such as the state, which 
are invested with power to apply sanctions against those who fail to conform. 
Consequently, organizations gain regulatory legitimacy by complying with the 
existing regulations in their organizational fields.  Normative legitimacy refers 
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to ideals, moral obligations and ideas about appropriated behavior which 
organizations are expected to follow.  Organizations attain normative 
legitimacy by conforming to the social and moral conventions of their 
organizational fields. And thirdly, cognitive legitimacy refers to taken-for-
granted assumptions, mental models and rational myths, which are translated 
into routines, practices and procedures. This dimension acknowledges that 
organizations “are not so much bundles of regulations or collections of norms, 
but knowledge systems” (Scott 1995:xviii). Therefore, organizations gain 
cognitive legitimacy by operating under the same reference frame as the rest of 
their organizational field (ibid.). 
Scott’s typology should be seen as an analytical device. In real life, different 
types of legitimacy tend to merge with one another (Brinkerhoff 2005, 
Deephouse and Suchman 2008).  Furthermore, stakeholders may apply all 
dimensions or a combination of them to judge whether or not an organization 
is legitimate (Ruef and Scott 1998 cited in Patel et al. 2005). Stakeholders may 
also favor one particular dimension of legitimacy over another (Ossewaarde et 
al. 2008:41). Consequently, gaining legitimacy in one dimension may risk the 
organization’s legitimacy in another (Scott 1995, Suchman 1995, Ossewaarde 
et al. 2008).  
Although the new institutionalism has advanced our understanding of 
organization-environment relations, the theory has not escaped criticism. A 
common viewpoint is that institutional theorists tend to downplay 
organizational resistance, agency and self-interest (DiMaggio 1988, Oliver 
1991, Fligstein 2001). Seeking to overcome this gap, scholars have shown that 
organizations not only resist and maneuver around isomorphic pressures 
(Oliver 1991), but create new institutional arrangements themselves 
(DiMaggio 1988). For instance, Oliver (1991) has showed that organizations 
employ a variety of strategies and tactics to deal with institutional pressures, 
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from acquiesce (e.g. following invisible, taken-for-granted norms) to 
manipulation (e.g. shaping values and criteria). 
NGOs and the pursuit of legitimacy 
NGOs are embedded in an organizational field: the international aid system. 
This field consists of a wide range of social actors involved in helping and 
assisting what has become known as “the South” (Tvedt 2006:681), and 
includes NGOs, INGOs, national development agencies, UN agencies, private 
and public donors, government agencies in developing countries, beneficiaries, 
and research institutions (Campion 2002). As Apthorpe (2011:199) reminds 
us, the international aid system, or “Aidland,” is a socially constructed world: 
Aidland has its own mental topographies, languages of discourse, lore 
and custom, and approaches to organizational knowledge and learning 
(…) [I]t generates and sustains to an extent its own politics and 
economics, geographics, demographics and other -ics (…) It even has 
its own handed-down secular-inspirational sort of ‘ten commandments’, 
the ‘thou shalt’ UN Millennium Development Goals. 
Several studies have shown that NGOs are driven to adopt structures and 
practices that conform to dominant discourses on development in Aidland. An 
example of this isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) is NGOs’ 
pervasive adoption of paper-based planning and reporting practices, despite 
their questionable effectiveness (Rauh 2010). 
Although few studies of NGOs use new institutionalism in a substantive way, 
there has been increasing interest in the topic of NGO legitimacy (Kuroda and 
Imata 2003).The concept has been applied to understand the internal dynamics 
of NGOs (Sauder 2002, Hilhorst 2003, Lister 2003, Goddard and Assad 2006, 
Hilhorst 2007, Ossewaarde et al. 2008) and to examine issues of 
representativeness in advocacy work (Atack 1999, Hudson 2000, Kuroda and 
Imata 2003, Vidal et al. 2006). In line with new institutional theory, 
researchers see legitimacy as essential for the success and survival of NGOs. 
Being perceived as reliable, trustworthy, and capable enables an NGO to 
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compete for scarce donor funds (Atack 1999, Nee 2003, Ossewaarde et al. 
2008) and to improve its efficiency in advocacy work (Hudson 2000, Pearce 
1997 cited in Lister 2003).  
Acquiring legitimacy is not an easy task (Hilhorst 2007). NGOs face multiple 
legitimacy criteria and legitimating audiences (donors, host governments, 
beneficiaries, the general public in their home country, etc.) (Lister 2003). As 
noted by Ossewarde et al. (2008:49), tensions between different types of 
legitimacy and stakeholders’ different priorities may conflict with one another, 
putting NGO legitimacy at risk. In a sense, actions to meet one legitimacy 
criterion may hinder the organization’s capacity to meet another.  
Researchers dealing with NGOs and development studies have identified five 
main criteria or “sources” of NGO legitimacy, which reflect rules, laws, belief 
systems, conventions, rational myths, and paradigms widespread in the aid 
industry (after Lister 2003):  
1. the moral character of NGOs’ mission, including  level of correlation 
between professed values and practices  (Saxby 1996, Edwards 1999, 
Atack 1999, Edwards and Zadek 2003, Vidal et al. 2006, Ossewaarde et 
al. 2008);  
2. legal compliance (Edwards 1999, Edwards and Zadek 2003, Lister 
2003, Ossewaarde et al. 2008);   
3. accountability and good governance (Edwards and Hulme 1995, Saxby 
1996, Atack 1999, Lister 2003, Vidal et al. 2006, Ossewaarde et al. 
2008);  
4. performance, efficiency, and technical expertise  (Saxby 1996, Eade 
1997, Fowler 1997, Pearce 1997, Atack 1999, Brown 2001, Edwards 
and Zadek 2003, Lister 2003, Vidal et al. 2006, Ossewaarde et al. 
2008);  
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5. experience in the South and partnership with Southern NGOs (Lister 
2001, Lister 2003, Brehm 2001 cited in Rauh 2010).  
Another source of NGO legitimacy is representativeness (Eade 1997, Pearce 
1997, Atack 1999, Hudson 2000, Edwards and Zadek 2003, Vidal et al. 2006). 
However, there seems to be confusion between how NGOs obtain legitimacy 
and what they achieve by being perceived as credible development actors. In 
this thesis, representativeness is understood as a consequence, not a source, of 
NGO legitimacy. Put differently, the representativeness of an NGO as 
“advocate of the poor” derives from its legitimacy as organization.  
These five sources of NGO legitimacy “form a composite of institutional 
pressures that create descriptions of reality for [an] organization: explanations 
of what is and what is not, what can be acted on and what cannot” (Hoffman 
2001:136). With some overlapping, they can be classified using Scott’s (1995) 
dimensions, as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Dimensions and sources of NGO legitimacy 
Legitimacy 
Dimensions Sources of NGO legitimacy 
Normative (1) Moral character of an NGO’s mission, including  
level of correlation between professed values and 
practices  
Regulatory (2) Legal compliance 
(3) Accountability and good governance 
Cognitive (3) Accountability and good governance 
(4) Performance, efficiency and technical expertise  
(5) Experience in the South and links with Southern 
NGOs 
Several researchers have suggested that NGO legitimacy stems from the moral 
character of their mission. For instance, Hilhorst (2003:7) notes that the term 
NGO has a moral component. As a label, it conveys that the organization is 
“doing good for the development of others” for reasons other than profit or 
politics. Who could argue that alleviating hunger and poverty, promoting 
children’s rights, or saving the environment are not morally right or worth 
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fighting for? Although congruence with “universal” values and ideals is a 
powerful source of legitimacy to NGOs, it also requires organizations to live 
up to their professed values. When an NGO fails to demonstrate that its actions 
and practices are in line with its self-proclaimed values and working 
principles, its normative legitimacy is jeopardized. For instance, an 
humanitarian NGO that claims to provide aid on the basis of need could be 
criticized if it selects beneficiaries on the basis of access or political reasons 
(Ossewaarde et al. 2008).  
Another source of NGO legitimacy is legal compliance. In most countries, 
NGO activity is governed by a legal framework which regulates their tax 
regime, access to foreign funding, registration as formal legal entities, amount 
of funds destined to the organization’s mission, etc. Organizations that fail to 
comply with NGO legislation in their home and host countries can suffer a 
range of sanctions, from financial penalties to having their activities 
criminalized (ICNL 2009a). Legal compliance also includes requirements 
imposed by donors in exchange for funding (conducting audits, submitting 
reports, etc.) as well as such self-regulatory mechanisms as the INGO 
Accountability Charter
6
 and the People in Aid Code of Good Practice
7
. 
Seen as an essential tool for NGOs to attract funds and fulfill their missions 
(Edwards and Hulme 1995), accountability is another aspect of NGO 
legitimacy particularly emphasized in the literature. According to Lewis 
(2001:144), confronting concerns about accountability “may be the key to the 
survival of the NGO movement.” Roughly put, NGO accountability involves 
transparency in the management of funds; openness about the organization’s 
structures, mission, policies, and activities; and reporting on financial 
performance, achievements and failures in an open and accurate manner 
                                              
6
 http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/ 
7
 http://www.peopleinaid.org/pool/files/code/code-en.pdf 
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(Wallace 1997 cited in Sauder 2002, INGO Accountability Charter 2012). 
NGO accountability extends up the aid chain, towards donors, as well as 
downwards, towards beneficiaries (Bornstein 2003 cited in Rauh 2010). In 
practice, however, NGOs tend to prioritize donor demands for accountability 
(Rauh 2010). 
Accountability is a source of both cognitive and regulatory legitimacy. 
Conformity to recognized accountability practices demonstrates that an NGO 
shares the same frame of reference (Scott 2001) with the rest of the aid 
industry. From a case study of accounting practices in three Tanzanian NGOs, 
Goddard and Assaud (2006) concluded that the perceived adequacy of 
accounting practices (or lack thereof) served as a symbol of their ability to 
manage funds, acting as a “legitimating tool” for these organizations. The idea 
of NGO accountability not only appears uncontestable across different 
stakeholders (Jordan and Tuijl 2006), but is enforced through norms and 
sanction.  NGOs that fail to conform to donor accountability requirements (be 
it reporting requirements, audit, etc.), risk being blacklisted and face shortage 
of funding. 
Performance and efficiency is a further aspect of NGO legitimacy closely 
linked to accountability. It seems that the entire aid industry has become 
obsessed with aid effectiveness. For instance, the World Bank stated in a 
recent brochure for its Program-for-Results that “[i]n today’s world, 
development is about results” (2011:2). The emphasis on measurable, 
quantitative, and short‐term results can be seen as a response to those who 
claim that foreign aid does not work and might even worsen the situation of 
developing countries. The aid industry thus seeks to prove itself by advocating 
performance indicators, tangible results, and value for money (Marcus 
2012:55). Being part of the “game,” NGOs also are affected by this “Results 
Obsession Disorder” (ibid.). They are increasingly required by donors and the 
general public to demonstrate that their projects and programs actually produce 
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results. It has become common practice among donors to evaluate the 
performance of NGOs to determine whether or not they should continue to 
support their activities (Jordan and Tuijl 2006). Additionally, being shown to 
deliver on results gives NGOs greater credibility for engaging in advocacy and 
policy lobbying (Atack 1999). 
NGO efficiency is often measured in terms of overhead ratio: the percentage 
of overall revenue spent on administration and fund-raising costs, as opposed 
to program expenses (Hermann et al. 2010). Donors and the general public 
assume that an efficient NGO will channel most of its budget to the 
beneficiaries (Lewis 2001). The lower the overheads, the more funds reach 
beneficiaries. Another measure of efficiency is Value for Money, which is 
achieved when an NGO maximizes the positive impacts on beneficiaries while 
minimizing the costs of its development interventions. This concept has 
become increasingly popular among DAC donors
8
. For instance, in late 2010 
Andrew Mitchell, the UK Secretary of State for International Development, 
stated: 
UK Government support for aid organisations will be targeted at those 
agencies which demonstrate they can deliver best Value for Money 
while they improve the health, education and welfare of millions of 
people in the poorest countries  (DFID 2010, cited in Nordtveit 
2012:57).   
The last key element of NGO legitimacy is experience in the South and 
partnership with Southern NGOs, which applies especially to INGOs. Ties 
with the South create the impression that an INGO understands what is 
happening on the ground, which gives it the legitimacy to conduct advocacy 
(Hudson 2000) and seek donor funding. In a study of consultation practices 
among British NGOs in Guatemala, Lister (2001) found evidence that local 
                                              
8
 The DAC has 24 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, France, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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partners were part of a “legitimating vocabulary,” especially among head 
office staff. The assumed wishes of partners were often used to justify 
organizations’ plans and actions. This is not without reason. Following the 
widely acknowledged failure of donor-driven and project-based interventionist 
approaches (OECD-DAC 1996:7 cited in Oaxaca 2006), partnership and 
developing local capacity have become the general rule in the development 
community since the late 1990s. Nevertheless, several researchers have shown 
that this partnership rhetoric may translate poorly into practice, with 
asymmetric relations and subtle uses of power (see Crewe and Harrison 1999, 
Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). 
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3. SAVE THE CHILDREN NORWAY (SCN) 
Building the imaginary world where a story takes place is a key task for writers 
of science fiction and fantasy, as it helps the reader to understand the 
characters, their motivations and actions. When it comes to case studies, this is 
not as different as might be thought. Despite their non-fictional purposes, 
researchers must also introduce the reader to the socially constructed reality 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966) where a case study takes place. How would it be 
possible, for instance, to investigate perceptions of organizational risk among 
SCN employees, without understanding the context where these people 
encounter risk and make judgments about it? This chapter offers an 
introduction to the world of SCN, setting the stage for the ensuing study of 
organizational risk perception.  
The first section of the chapter provides a general overview of SCN. The 
second presents the restructuring process underway in SCN when fieldwork 
was conducted. The third briefly outlines the organization’s legal and 
regulatory environment, and the fourth section describes SCN’s organizational 
structure and governance model for international programs as of December 
2011.  
3.1 SCN at a glance 
Save the Children Norway is an international non-governmental child rights 
organization, with no religious or political affiliations. It was established in 
1946 to provide support for children affected by the Second World War in 
Norway and other European countries (Larsen 2006). SCN is a leading 
member of Save the Children (SC), one of the world’s largest umbrella 
organizations focusing on children. SC consists of 30 national organizations 
with operations in 120 countries and combined revenues of USD 1.6 billion 
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(SCI 2012). With total revenues of NOK 625 million in 2011 (SCN 2012a,b), 
SCN is the fourth largest member of SC (SCI 2012) and one of the five largest 
NGOs in Norway. 
Guided by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UN 
Declaration on Human Rights, SCN works to promote children’s rights and to 
improve living conditions of vulnerable children worldwide. As a dual-
mandate organization, SCN engages in humanitarian and long-term 
development work. The organization follows a rights-based approach and 
focuses on seven thematic areas: education, emergencies, child protection, 
health, nutrition, child rights governance, prevention of HIV/AIDS, and 
support to affected children. In 2011, SCN reached about 5.5 million children 
in 29 countries
9
 in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East, in 
addition to Norway (SCN 2012a,b). In 12 of these countries
10
, SCN was 
present through a local office, referred to as “country office” or “country 
program.” In the remaining countries SCN provided funds or technical 
expertise to programs run by other SC organizations  
In 2009, SCN adopted a new vision, mission, and set of values, which are 
shared by all SC national organizations. Its working principles remained 
unaltered (see Table 2).  
 
 
                                              
9
 In Africa: Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. In Asia: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, in 
addition the occupied areas of Palestine. In Europe: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Romania, 
and Russia. In Latin America: the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Mexico.  
10
 In Africa: Ethiopia, Zambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe. In Asia: Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, and Nepal. 
In Europe: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russia. In Latin-America: Nicaragua.  
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Table 2: SCN’s mission, vision, values, and working principles  
Mission To inspire breakthroughs in the way the world treats children, 
and to achieve immediate and lasting change in their lives. 
Vision A world in which every child attains the right to survival, 
protection, development and participation. 
Values 1. Accountability: We take personal responsibility for using our 
resources efficiently, achieving measurable results, and being 
accountable to supporters, partners and, most of all, children. 
2. Ambition: We place demands on ourselves and our 
colleagues, set high goals, and are committed to improving the 
quality of everything we do for children. 
3. Collaboration: We respect and value each other, thrive on our 
diversity, and work with partners to leverage our global strength 
in making a difference for children. 
4. Creativity: We are open to new ideas, embrace change, and 
take disciplined risks to develop sustainable solutions for and 
with children. 
5. Integrity: We aspire to live up to the highest standards of 
personal honesty and behavior; we never compromise our 
reputation and always act in the best interests of children. 
Working  
principles 
1. We support children’s participation, and identify who has 
responsibility for fulfilling children’s rights. 
2. We build local and national capacity. 
3. We actively engage in political advocacy to influence policies 
that can achieve sustainable change for large numbers of 
children. 
4. We deliver measurable and sustainable results for children, 
and we keep our promises. 
5. We are innovative and reach out to many children; 
Source: SCN (2009:2,5)  
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SCN depends primarily on external sources of income such as grants and 
donations. In 2011, the organization obtained 37 percent of its revenues from 
individual donors, 30 percent from the Norwegian government, and 33 percent 
from other sources
11
 (SCN 2012a,b). The collaboration with the Norwegian 
government dates back to the late 1960s (Kruse et al. 2009). In 2009, SCN 
signed a five-year core funding agreement of nearly NOK 750 million with the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) for the period 
2010–2014 (Norad 2010:9). Other sources of Norwegian state funding include 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and embassies in the countries where 
SCN has operations.  
At the time of my fieldwork, SCN was undergoing a major restructuring 
process. Seeking to become more efficient and influential, the umbrella 
organization SC was moving from being a loose confederation of national 
organizations to become a federation with strong centralized authority 
(Jayawickrama 2012). This is the most recent chapter in a lengthy unification 
process among SC national organizations that has introduced significant 
changes in how SCN operates internationally.  
3.2 Unification  
Save the Children (SC) was founded in the United Kingdom, in 1919, and was 
later followed by similar organizations in other countries. For decades, SC was 
a loose confederation of autonomous members, formerly known as the 
International Save the Children Alliance (“the Alliance”). Although united by 
a common objective and name, SC organizations have operated independently 
for most of their history. There were, for instance, five member organizations 
operating in Uganda, with different country offices, staff and program 
                                              
11
 For example, SC national organizations and European Union grants. 
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priorities. Since the late 1990s, SC organizations have been slowly coming 
together as one, in what is referred to as the Unification process in this thesis.  
Although member organizations have been working to improve cooperation in 
emergencies since 1997, the Unification process officially started in 2004, 
when the Alliance adopted a common set of challenges for the period 2005–
2010. One of these challenges was to merge operations in developing countries 
where more than one SC organization was present. Launched in 2004, the 
Unified Presence initiative aimed at strengthening SC’s presence at the country 
level, reducing costs and enhancing efficiency. The initiative introduced a 
shared-governance system, in which only one member runs all SC’s operations 
in the country, with funding and strategic directions provided by others. As an 
organizational review of SCN commissioned by Norad rightly noted: “[the] 
arrangement appears as a pragmatic compromise in which a small group of SC 
members (donors) have divided up the world and decided who should manage 
what country [office]” (Kruse et al. 2009:15). 
The Unified Presence created a need to establish common work processes 
across SC organizations, which in turn led to the Core Processes 
Harmonization (CPH) initiative. Cross-member steering groups were 
established to assess members’ administrative systems and to design 
harmonized processes for unified country offices. Several guidelines have 
been introduced since 2009, including financial management, planning and 
reporting, safety and security, grant management, and monitoring/ evaluation. 
To reduce the managerial complexity created by the Unification, SCN has 
adopted all CPH guidelines and SC’s policies across all country offices, 
regardless of their stage in the Unification process. 
The Unification reached a crucial stage in November 2009, when all SC 
organizations adopted a new global strategy for 2010–2015. Among other 
things, the document introduced a new global governance system. The 
Alliance’s relatively small secretariat was replaced by a stronger central entity, 
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Save the Children International (SCI). Based in London, SCI is accountable to 
all members via a newly appointed CEO and international board of directors. 
The new strategy brought a new global operating model for delivering 
international programs and advocacy for children. Members agreed to transfer 
the management of all international development and emergency operations to 
SCI’s International Programs Unit (IPU). Consequently, SCI is to assume the 
operational management of all country offices previously run by member 
organizations, overseeing a budget of nearly a USD 1 billion (Jayawickrama 
2012). The rationale for such a drastic transformation was threefold. First, the 
merger would improve efficiency by harmonizing administrative systems 
across country offices. Second, the new programming set-up would reduce 
SC’s overall administrative costs by approximately 30 percent (as of 
November 2009). Third, SC would become a stronger global player, with more 
resources and influence (Save the Children 2009).  
Although member organizations will remain in charge of operations in their 
home countries, the so-called “transition to SCI” will drastically change their 
relationship with country offices. SCN and other SC national organizations 
will move from being managers to become shareholders. They will “put the 
money in,” but will not run international programs or projects. Under this new 
operational model, member organizations will focus on resource mobilization 
and constituency building in their home countries, while providing strategic 
directions and technical expertise to country offices.  
Initiated in 2011, the merger of all SC’s international programs is to be 
completed by 2013. In the meantime, member organizations must juggle with 
different governance systems in order to operate internationally. For instance, 
SCN directly supported 11country offices in 2011: three country offices that 
have been recently transferred to SCI (Cambodia, Laos, and Nepal/Bhutan); 
four country offices that have been unified under the leadership of SCN 
(Albania, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Zimbabwe); and four non-unified country 
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offices that remained exclusively under SCN management (Ethiopia, Russia, 
South East Europe
12
, and Zambia).  
3.3 Legal and regulatory environment 
To understand SCN’s structure and management, it is important to discuss 
some aspects of its operating environment. As an INGO, SCN is obliged to 
follow the local laws and regulations in all countries where it operates. This 
will vary from country to country, and may include income/profit tax 
exemptions; the tax treatment of income from economic activities; 
applicability of Value Added Tax (VAT) and taxes on property; income taxes 
for national and international staff ; staff employment, work permits, fringe 
benefits, employee tax withholdings and other compensations; currency 
exchange regulations; registration with national governmental agencies; 
transferences of international funding, to mention some of the most usual areas 
(ICNL 2009a,b). 
Another form of regulatory power exerted over SCN involves public donors, 
such as Norad or the MFA. In entering into a funding agreement with these 
donors, SCN must make a compromise to satisfy their requirements. For 
instance, the Norwegian government regulates financial support provided to 
NGOs in various ways. Recipient organizations are required to submit annual 
progress and financial reports, and present independently audited financial 
statements for the entire organization as well as the specific project(s) 
supported by Norwegian state funds (Norad 2006).  
In addition, the Norwegian government introduced in 2006 a zero-tolerance 
policy on corruption in development cooperation. According to this policy:  
the grant recipient is obliged to organise its operation and activities in 
such a way that corruption, misuse of funds and financial irregularities 
                                              
12 Covering three countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro 
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are effectively countered through the entire organisation down to the 
end user (Norad 2011:5).  
Any suspicion of financial irregularities must be immediately communicated to 
the MFA’s Foreign Service Control Unit for investigation. Until the case is 
closed, further transfers of funding to the grant recipient are put on hold. If 
evidence of fraud or corruption is documented, funds must be reimbursed to 
the Norwegian government (ibid.).  
3.4 SCN’s structure and management 
As a membership-based NGO, SCN is open to any person who supports the 
organization’s objectives. Individual members13 participate in the decision-
making process through the National Congress, the highest authority of SCN. 
The organization has other two governing bodies: the Council of 
Representatives, which serves as an advisory body and exercises supervision 
over certain matters; and the Board of Directors, which provides strategic 
direction to SCN’s operations (see Figure 3). The organization is headed by a 
General Secretary, who is accountable to the board. 
SCN’s head office in Oslo has a relatively flat organizational structure. As of 
November 2011, there were 114 employees (SCN 2012b) divided into six 
departments: Human Resources; Marketing; Public Relations; Finance, 
Information Technology (IT) and Operations; Domestic Programs and 
International Programs (see Figure 3). The Domestic Programs Department 
coordinates projects and activities implemented in Norway. The International 
Programs Department oversees operations abroad, which include four main 
tasks: supervision of country offices directly managed by the organization; 
monitoring programs funded by SCN and implemented with other SC 
                                              
13
 Individual members are Norwegian citizens or foreigners living in Norway who pay an annual fee 
(NOK 200–NOK 250). They are encouraged to volunteer for projects and activities implemented by 
SCN in Norway. 
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organizations; providing technical support in thematic areas; and grants 
management. Changes in SCN’s organizational structure were expected to take 
place early in 2012, as more and more country offices were to be transferred to 
the management of SCI. 
Figure 3: SCN's organizational structure (as of November 2011) 
 
Source: SCN (2011) - translated by the author from original in Norwegian 
Country offices are to some extent organizations in their own right (see Figure 
4). They vary in number of employees, projects implemented and partners, as 
well as annual budget size, program priorities, operating context, and 
management practices. In 2011, for instance, the country office in Uganda had 
about 134 employees while the country office in Russia had only nine. On the 
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other hand, some characteristics are common to all country offices. All offices 
are headed by a country director, who reports to SCN or SCI, depending on the 
governance scheme. Moreover, most staff members are hired locally, although 
some country offices have expats from SCN or other SC national organizations 
in leadership positions. Despite their fund-raising efforts, all country offices 
depend on funding channeled by SCN and other SC members.  
Figure 4: Organizational chart – Country Office Ethiopia (as of September 
2010) 
 
Source: SCN (2010a:22) 
We now turn to some key aspects of SCN’s management practices in 
international development and humanitarian work. This review will not 
include the organization’s operations in its home country, Norway. 
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3.4.1 Emphasis on measurable results 
To ensure that its programs have an impact in improving the lives of 
vulnerable children, SCN has a comprehensive system for planning, 
monitoring, and evaluation. The process begins with the development of 
SCN’s strategy and country offices’ strategy plans, which takes place every 
four to five. Developed in a participatory manner, these documents set out the 
overall goals, choice of thematic areas (education, child protection, etc.), and 
geographical presence at the international and national levels.  
On the basis of these strategy papers, each country office then develops an 
annual plan, which is a summary of objectives, results, indicators, activities, 
and budget planned for the coming year. The information is consolidated in a 
Logical Framework Matrix (or Logframe), a popular paper-based planning tool 
among donors and NGOs in the USA and Europe (Rauh 2010). All expected 
results are accompanied with indicators for monitoring and evaluation against 
a baseline (see Table 3). In addition, country offices develop plans for thematic 
areas and projects to assist in the implementation of day-to-day activities.  
Table 3: Measurable results  
Planned 
Objective 
Expected 
results  
Quantifiable results indicators 
(outcome level) 
2.2: Increased 
number of 
children of school 
age who are 
currently not 
attending school, 
especially girls, 
gaining access to 
education and 
gainful vocational 
training 
Result 2.1: 
Increased 
enrolment of 
children 
primary and 
basic 
education. 
2.1.1:  Net enrolment rate increased by 
4% 
2.1.2: 171 out-of-school children 
enrolled in Alternative Education 
Program (AEP). 
2.1.2.1: 80% (140 out of 171) of AEP 
children enrolled in schools. 
2.1.3: 963 Children with disabilities 
enrolled in schools in SC program areas. 
Source: Country Office Nepal – Annual Plan 2011 (SCN 2010b:11) 
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SCN follows up on the implementation of country annual plans through formal 
and informal mechanisms. Country offices are required to submit quarterly and 
annual reports on activities conducted, results achieved, and disbursement of 
funds. These reports provide information on changes in the country context, 
management issues, the degree of achievement of results, and any deviations 
from the annual plan. The country annual report reviews the objectives and 
results achieved over the course of the year, including the total number of 
children reached through projects and programs. This allows SCN to calculate 
and publicize its total reach. This formal monitoring system is supplemented 
by daily communication between head office and country office staff, as well 
as visits to country offices.  
In addition, SCN carries out program and administrative reviews and 
evaluations of its work. The first type of review aims at asserting the impact, 
effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of development and humanitarian 
interventions; while the second investigates whether country offices have 
adequate management systems. Evaluation responsibilities are shared between 
Oslo and the country offices. The head office focuses on strategic-level 
evaluations, such as evaluations of country office strategy or global 
evaluations of thematic areas. Country offices concentrate on project-based 
reviews and evaluations. In practice, the actual evaluation work is normally 
carried out by consultants engaged for that purpose. 
In country offices directly managed by SCN, the head office approves 
strategies, annual plans, quarterly and annual reports. In unified country 
offices under the leadership of SCN, other SC organizations participate in this 
process to the extent they are financially involved (whether supporting the 
entire country office, or only some projects). With the transition to SCI, the 
official approval process is to be transferred to the IPU. However, members 
will still approve how their funds are to be used and will receive information 
that meets the requirements set by their donors. 
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SCN’s planning, monitoring, and evaluation system is designed to match the 
reporting requirements of its donors, Norad in particular. To obtain its current 
five-year cooperation agreement with the Norwegian government, SCN had to 
provide a five-year plan that was based on the country offices’ strategies. In 
addition, SCN must annually submit a concise report on results achieved, to be 
based on the annual report from the country offices. At the end of the 
agreement period, the organization will be required to submit to Norad a 
comprehensive report on the impact of its activities in advancing children’s 
rights against results promised.  
3.4.2 Working with partners 
Since the 1980s, SCN has gradually moved from self-implementation towards 
working through local partners (Kruse et al. 2009). Today, partnership is one 
of the organization’s key working principles. According to SCN’s Policy for 
Strengthening Local Capacity (2007b:1),  
[this] reflects the acknowledgement that international NGOs can 
provide only limited contributions to the humanitarian challenges in our 
times. Sustained impact can only be achieved when national and local 
government and local people take responsibility for their own future. 
In most country offices, projects are generally implemented through local 
partners, which may include national and local governmental agencies (the 
Ministry of Education, human rights institutions, police, social welfare 
institutions, etc.) and civil society (local NGOs, community-based 
organizations, child groups, etc.). Some country offices, such as Nepal, have 
about 100 partners (Save the Children 2012a:25). SCN sees it as a strength to 
have a mix of government and civil society partners. This “mix,” however, will 
vary, depending on available partners in each country. For instance, the 
country office in Russia works primarily with government agencies, whereas 
the country office in Uganda works mainly with local NGOs.  
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Each country office is responsible for selecting and following up on the work 
of its partners. This involves a series of formal and informal mechanisms, 
including project plans, periodic progress and financial reports, project and 
partner audits, monitoring visits, and daily communications. Although specific 
procedures vary from one country office to another, the assessment of 
partners’ suitability focuses on four criteria: capacity to implement projects on 
the ground and deliver planned results; capacity to comply with SCN’s 
reporting requirements; quality of financial management and trustworthiness; 
compatibility with SCN’s mandate, values, and objectives.  
3.4.3 Financial management 
SCN places great emphasis on cost-efficiency 
and financial control. For the organization, 
optimum funds utilization means ensuring that 
most of SCN’s income is spent on programs 
for children, and not on administrative costs. 
In 2011, administration and fundraising 
expenses accounted for 1.9 percent and 10.2 
percent of SCN’s overall budget, respectively 
(see Figure 5). With over 80 percent of its 
funds being used for program activities, SCN 
falls within the percentage of total 
expenditure regarded as ideal by the World 
Association of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (WANGO 2004:17)  
To promote efficiency and safeguarding its assets from financial 
mismanagement, SCN adopts various internal control mechanisms. For 
instance, the organization has been using the system Agresso Planner since 
2002. This budgeting, forecasting, and planning tool provides support to 
Figure 5: Distribution 
of costs – 2011 
Source: SCN (2012b) 
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controllers in Oslo and the country offices on daily finance management 
activities. It allows SCN to consolidate financial information at both head 
office and country office levels. In addition, country offices are required to 
submit monthly financial reports and quarterly prognoses for the full year’s 
expenditure and income. SCN also has in place procedures related to approval 
of payments, electronic transfers, handling of petty cash, etc.  
Regular external audits are another key component of financial management at 
SCN. They are required both by SCN’s governing bodies and donors. Country 
offices are audited twice a year. The first audit, a half-year review, focuses on 
the control environment to ensure that controls and policies are in place. The 
second audit carry out at the end of the year focuses mainly on financial 
statements. Audits of partners are conducted to ensure that partners have spent 
funds as planned. These audits are either project-based or partner-based, 
depending on the volume of funds provided by SCN. Although auditing firms 
are hired by each country office, they must follow the supervision and auditing 
standards set by the organization’s Finance Department in Oslo and SCN's 
official auditor, selected by the National Congress. 
Even with these financial controls, SCN has experienced a few cases of 
corruption and fraud in recent years, although none of them involved large 
amounts of funds. In 2011, the organization reported three cases in which 
funds were misused by local partners in Bosnia-Herzegovina (NOK 10,000), 
Zimbabwe (NOK 2500) and Uganda (NOK 30,000). The first two cases are 
now closed and SCN has recovered the funds; the third case remains under 
investigation (SCN 2012c). SCN is meticulous about following up any cases of 
corruption, even when the amount in question is very small in comparison to 
its overall budget. 
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3.4.4 Humanitarian assistance 
SC national organizations have been working to improve cooperation and 
coordination in emergency situations since 1997. This process led to the 
development of a common governance structure, including principles, rules, 
roles and responsibilities during humanitarian operations. The system has 
evolved throughout the years to adapt to changes introduced with the Unified 
Presence initiative, and more recently, with the transition of country offices to 
the management of SCI. 
Under the current scheme, SC categorizes emergencies as “declared” or “non-
declared,” which are distinguished in terms of scale and severity. Declared 
emergencies are larger and more complex, requiring a unified effort on the part 
of all members, as with the floods in Pakistan in 2010 and the earthquake in 
Japan in 2011. Non-declared emergencies are smaller in scale and require a 
response by the country office in the affected country. Previously, declared 
emergencies were led by member organizations with special expertise in this 
type of work, such as SCUS and SCUK. With the merger of all international 
programs, SCI's International Programs Unit will assume the coordination of 
all declared emergencies.   
Currently, SCN and other SC organizations have four main roles in emergency 
operations: to inform their domestic constituencies about the humanitarian 
crisis; to seek funding from national donors to support the emergency 
response, in line with the appeal and strategy targets; to second personnel to 
assist in the intervention; and to provide technical assistance. 
3.4.5 Advocacy work 
SCN engages in advocacy work to influence the policies and actions of 
governments, international institutions, companies and civil society towards 
children. This involves, for example, lobbying the Ministry of Education in 
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countries where SCN operates or influencing the content of UN resolutions 
and Norwegian governmental White Papers. The organization not only 
documents violations of children’s rights and their root causes, but proposes 
practical solutions drawing on its experience on the ground. In addition, SCN 
promotes the participation of children and adolescents in advocacy campaigns, 
enabling them to have a voice in matters that concern them.  
Advocacy work is conducted on the basis of a division of responsibilities 
between the public relations department in Oslo and country office staff. In 
country offices directly managed by SCN, national advocacy campaigns are 
carried out by the local staff with support from head office. Additionally, SCN 
has throughout the years increased its collaboration with other SC members in 
advocacy efforts. One of the Alliance’s common challenges for the period 
2005–2010 was the education campaign Rewrite the Future. Conducted 
between 2005 and 2011, Rewrite the Future is considered SC's first global 
campaign. 
3.4.6 Risk management 
There is an overall awareness of the risks involved in SCN’s work and the 
need to manage them. In fact, if “risk management” is understood in its 
broadest sense, there exist several policies and internal control mechanisms for 
dealing with risks for the organization and its beneficiaries. For instance, SCN 
has a Child Safeguarding Protocol (Save the Children 2010a), setting out the 
procedures and systems for protecting children involved with the organization 
from harm. Another example is the CPH Safety and Security Policy and 
Standards (Save the Children 2010b), which provides orientation and sets 
norms for dealing with risks to the safety and security of staff. Both policies 
have replaced guidelines that SCN used before the Unification. In addition, 
several policies that provide guidance for work processes in SCN note the 
potential risks. For instance, the Procurement Policy and Guidelines (SCN 
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2010f) list the major risks involved with procurement; and the Policy on 
Children’s Participation (SCN 2010d) draws attention to the dilemmas and 
risks involved in promoting children’s participation in SCN’s advocacy 
campaigns.  
SCN has zero tolerance of fraud and corruption, and has adopted several 
strategies to minimize financial mismanagement. For instance, an alert-raising 
mechanism enables individuals or groups associated with the organization to 
report anonymously on suspicions of non-compliance with SCN’s ethical 
principles
14
. These are investigated by the Control Committee, which is 
appointed by the Council of Representatives and is not directly involved in the 
operations of the organization.   
Due to the Unification process, SCN has also adopted new guidelines and 
global policies from SCI that include procedures to identify and manage risks. 
For instance, the CPH grant management guidelines include a five-stage 
process for assessing and managing the risks that a grant brings to SC (SCI 
2011). The emphasis on risk management is likely to come even in focus with 
the transition to SCI. At the time of my fieldwork, SCI was in the process of 
hiring a Risk Manager, developing an official risk policy, and establishing risk 
management process. These will be embedded into all country offices under 
the management of SCI’s International Programs Unit. 
And yet, this is merely the tip of the iceberg. As Hutter and Power (2005:1–2) 
remind us, “the management of risk in general is a constitutive feature of 
organizations.” SCN’s accounting practices; its planning, monitoring and 
evaluation routines; its procedures for hiring employees and selecting partners 
– all play a role in the management of risk in its broadest sense. 
                                              
14
 The organization has adopted the INGO Accountability Charter. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
Having introduced the “world” of SCN, I will describe how this study was 
conducted and the rationale for the choice of research methods. I begin by 
introducing the overall research design, and then outline the methods used for 
data collection and how the data was analyzed. Finally, I discuss some 
weaknesses of this thesis. 
4.1 Research design 
In any given study, the choice of research design will stem from the 
researcher’s philosophical assumptions about the nature the world and how it 
should be studied (Moses and Knutsen 2007). This is evident in risk 
scholarship, where a plethora of competing ontological and epistemological 
views on risk
15
 inform different research approaches (Rosa 1998). Therefore, it 
is essential to clarify where this study stands, before discussing the 
methodology. 
4.1.1 A socio-cultural perspective on risk  
This work is grounded in a socio-cultural perspective on risk (e.g. Lupton and 
Tulloch 2002, Tulloch and Lupton 2003, Bickerstaff 2004). Traced back to 
Douglas’ (1985, 1992) view of risk as socially constructed, this approach 
rejects the idea of risk as an objective entity that exists somewhere out there, 
independent of the human beings who perceive it (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 
2006, Zinn 2006). Rather, the socio-cultural perspective maintains that risk 
should be understood as a social phenomenon influenced by broader social 
                                              
15
 These include “revealed preference versus perceived preference, cultural theory versus rational 
action, social constructivism versus naive positivism, methodological individualism versus 
methodological holism, etc.” (Rosa 1998:16) 
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factors and societal processes, as well as by individual personal experience 
(Zinn 2006). Understandings about risk are seen as historical, local, and 
subject to continuous debate and reconstruction (Tulloch and Lupton 2003, 
Zinn 2006). However, the socio-cultural perspective seeks to overcome the 
theoretical abstraction and functionalistic character of cultural theory, which 
attributes differences in perception and response to risk to individual 
adherence to certain modes of social organization (Zinn 2006). 
Coming from anthropology, geography, and sociology, proponents of the 
socio-cultural perspective hold that risk issues must be studied in the contexts 
where people encounter and make judgments about risk, such as everyday life 
or organizations. Consequently, they favor qualitative data collection 
techniques, contextual data analysis, and thick descriptions (Taylor-Gooby and 
Zinn 2006, Zinn 2006).   
4.1.2 A qualitative approach 
Qualitative inquiry seeks to make sense of the multiple meanings that 
individuals and groups bring to human affairs (Creswell 2007, Stake 2010). 
Holistic and field-oriented, qualitative research investigates complex social 
phenomena in real-life settings, where researchers interact closely with 
participants for extended periods of time (Stake 2010). The approach is known 
for its reflexivity, as researchers are aware that their interpretations cannot be 
separated from their own backgrounds, prior knowledge, and philosophical 
assumptions (Creswell 2007). 
In line with a socio-cultural perspective on risk, this study has adopted a 
qualitative approach to investigate how perceptions of organizational risks are 
constructed. Although quantitative inquiry has otherwise dominated the study 
of risk perception (Gustafsod 1998, Wåhlberg 2001), a qualitative approach 
was deemed preferable here because it allows the researcher to tap into 
people’s thoughts, judgments, and beliefs about risk in the very context where 
 54 
these understandings are produced. In addition, since research design cannot 
be separated from philosophical assumptions in risk scholarship, a reflexive 
methodological approach seemed particularly relevant. 
4.1.3 Case-study method 
The socio-cultural perspective on risk that underlies this study calls for 
context-oriented research. The case-study method was considered the most 
appropriate approach for capturing the interplay between employee 
perceptions of organizational risks and the broad organizational context where 
these views are constructed.  
Case study is an empirical research method that enables scholars to investigate 
contemporary phenomena within their natural setting (Yin 2003a, Scholtz and 
Tietje 2002 cited in Swanson and Holton 2005). By making use of multiple 
sources of evidence and data collection techniques (Hancock and Algozzine 
2006), the method can produce a wealth of information and allow researchers 
to explore the multiple variables that influence a given phenomenon (Swanson 
and Holton 2005).In addition, cases studies draw attention to context, 
providing thorough descriptions (Yin 2003a, Swanson and Holton 2005).The 
context is recognized as important, whether because it is essential for 
understanding a phenomenon or because the phenomenon under investigation 
cannot be easily distinguished from its context (Yin 2003a). Researchers must 
delimit where the case begins and ends, which is done by selecting a unit of 
analysis and specific space and time boundaries (ibid). In organizational 
research, case studies have been conducted using employees, departments, or 
entire organizations as the unit of analysis (Swanson and Holton 2005).  
This thesis can be described as a holistic single case study (Yin 2003a), 
conducted for both exploratory (ibid.) and instrumental purposes (Stake 1994, 
1995 cited in Berg 2001). Having selected SCN, I defined the organization 
itself as primary unit of analysis. The choice of single-case design reflects the 
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impossibility of researching more than one organization in depth, given the 
constraints on time and funding. The choice of a single unit of analysis stems 
from a critical assessment of the only study available of organizational risk 
perception in NGOs (Mohammed 2007). As noted in Chapter 2, that study 
takes organizational context for granted, failing to problematize the very 
context where perceptions of organizational risk are investigated. In view of 
that shortcoming, this thesis adopted SCN as primary unit of analysis to situate 
employees’ perceptions of organizational risk within the context of the aid 
industry itself.  
The choice of SCN was not due to its possible uniqueness (Stake 1994 cited in 
Berg 2001). There are at least four other Norwegian NGOs
16
 that could help to 
advance our understanding of organizational risk perception in humanitarian 
and development NGOs, given their size, international presence, and 
operational complexity. SCN was selected largely because of the possibilities 
of gaining sufficient access. However, that is not to say that the case was not 
properly investigated. Since the topic of risk and NGOs remains so little 
examined, I adopted an exploratory research approach, in order to establish 
questions and hypotheses for subsequent investigations (Yin 2003b). 
Consequently, data collection was based on broad set of questions rather than a 
pre-defined research problem (see interview guide in Appendix A). That has 
implications for the findings of this study, a point discussed at the end of this 
chapter. 
4.2 Data collection 
The fieldwork for this study was conducted in Norway between August 31 and 
November 22, 2011. Two qualitative data collection strategies were used: in-
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 Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian People’s Aid, and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council 
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depth semi-structured interviews with employees; and analysis of 
organizational documents. The interviews served as primary source of 
information, while the internal documents were used to gain a better 
understanding of the context. Since I am not fluent in Norwegian, I was not 
able to use participant observation as a data collection strategy. 
4.2.1 Access to fieldwork 
Gaining access to the research setting is a common challenge faced by 
organizational researchers. According to Buchanan et al. (1988), researchers 
must be prepared to spend weeks and even months to secure access to 
fieldwork, as this process depends on the organization’s goodwill. I adopted 
three strategies suggested in the literature on organizational studies for gaining 
access to SCN: I explored my connections with the target organization 
(Buchanan et al. 1988, Laurila 1997, Shenton and Hayter 2004); I offered to 
share the research findings (Sharp and Howard 1996, Shenton and Hayter 
2004); and I portrayed the research project as useful and risk-free (Buchanan et 
al. 1988,Yeager and Kram 1990 cited in Laurila 1997).    
The first contact with SCN was established in June 2011. My thesis supervisor 
asked an acquaintance in the organization to receive a research proposal and 
circulate it for internal discussion. A formal request for research access was 
then submitted, with letter of intent, research proposal, and a recommendation 
letter from my supervisor. Official permission to study SCN was granted by 
email in the beginning of July. Although obtaining formal access took only a 
month, a meeting to discuss the practicalities of research originally scheduled 
for early August had to be postponed to the end of the month, delaying the 
beginning of fieldwork.  
At this meeting, I presented the research project and negotiated the practical 
aspects of research. These included procedures for scheduling interviews and 
collecting documents, confidentiality issues, and time available for interviews. 
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I was granted access to internal documents, and was allowed to contact staff 
and schedule interviews during working hours. In addition, one staff member 
was appointed as my “link person” (Buchanan et al. 1988:60), which would 
help me to contact respondents and obtain documents. Nevertheless, SCN 
made it clear that it was up to each employee to decide whether or not to 
participate. Formal access to the research setting was not a guarantee that 
employees would serve as informants (Laurila 1997).  
To build goodwill, I offered to make the thesis available to SCN and to 
produce a short report with findings relevant for the organization. In addition, I 
tried to show that giving me research access would not entail risks for SCN. 
For instance, I volunteered to sign non-disclosure agreements with SCN and 
SCI (see Appendix B), which included the obligation to restrict public access 
to the completed master’s thesis.  
4.2.2 Interviews 
Interviews are recognized as a good strategy for producing data about people’s 
opinions, feelings, ideas, and experiences (Denscombe 2007). This study 
involved semi-structured interviews using a set of open-ended questions that 
were developed prior to the fieldwork. That approach allows the researcher to 
stay focused on relevant topics for the study, without restricting participants’ 
ability to articulate their own thoughts or raise additional issues (ibid). 
The interviews were normally arranged via email. I sent invitations to potential 
respondents, with information about the research objectives and questions. 
This strategy worked well. Most of those I contacted replied, either to make an 
appointment or to say they did not wish to be interviewed. The actual 
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interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes; they normally began with 
general questions about the respondent,
17
 followed by questions about risk.  
Due to funding limitations on conducting research outside Norway, the 
interview procedures were not uniform across the sample. Three approaches 
were adopted: face-to-face interviews, Skype interviews, and email interviews. 
I conducted 23 interviews in total, using Skype in six and email in one of them 
(see Table 4). The face-to-face interviews were all conducted at SCN 
headquarters in Oslo. Using Skype allowed me to reach respondents in four 
countries, otherwise impossible due to time and cost constraints. This was 
particularly important because the bulk of SCN operations take place outside 
Norway. On the other hand, Skype cannot provide the same levels of 
information possible in a face-of-face interview: even with a video camera, 
some body language is inevitably lost (Cater 2011). I also experienced some 
problems in using Skype for interviewing. For one thing, I had intended to use 
both audio and video; however, this proved possible in only a few interviews. 
Some respondents preferred not to use video, others did not have a camera, or 
their Internet connection was simply unable to sustain video and audio 
connection simultaneously. In practice, most Skype interviews were basically 
telephone interviews.  
All respondents allowed me to record the interviews, except one who asked me 
to take notes instead. I used a digital voice recorder for face-to-face interviews 
and the software Pamela
18
 for Skype interviews. All interviews were 
conducted in English. This was generally not a problem, as most respondents 
spoke good English. However, with four respondents I experienced 
communication problems. It was evident that they would have expressed their 
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 Such as: main task and responsibilities, period of time working for the organization, etc. 
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 http://www.pamela.biz/en/ 
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views more freely in their mother tongues. That, however, would have 
required me to be fluent or hire interpreters in four different languages. 
Sampling strategy 
Given the exploratory nature of this study and SCN’s international presence, 
the selection of participants was based on a maximum variation sampling. This 
strategy aims at achieving a heterogeneous group of interviewees (Swanson 
and Holton 2005). Such sampling allows the researcher to capture a wide 
range of perspectives about the phenomenon under investigation and to 
identify common patterns across the sample (Swanson and Holton 2005).The 
strategy requires researchers to identify the variables they want to maximize in 
the selection of respondents (Sandelowski 1995). Three variables were 
selected for this study: working location (e.g. head office, various country 
offices); area of function (human resources, finance, programs, etc.); and place 
in the hierarchical structure (field office, country director, regional director, 
general secretary, etc.). 
During fieldwork, however, executing a maximum variation sampling strategy 
proved impossible. Due to research access restrictions (explained in section 
4.5.1 below), I had to adopt a convenience sampling strategy: that is, selecting 
respondents on the basis of their availability for participating in the research 
project (Denscombe 2007). In turn, that meant that the final sample was 
dominated by respondents from certain working locations (especially Nepal, 
Uganda, head office) and functional areas/organizational levels (especially 
program implementation and senior management team). The information 
related to functional area and organizational level was aggregated in order to 
protect the identity of respondents.  In total, I interviewed 23 respondents: 11 
employees from SCN head office in Oslo, two from other SC organizations 
(SCI and SC Denmark); and 10 from country offices in Cambodia, Ethiopia, 
Nepal, South East Europe (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro), 
Russia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (see Table 4).
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Table 4: Sample overview 
 
Code name Working location 
Area of function / 
organizational level 
Type of interview 
Interview      
date 
C
o
u
n
try
 O
ffices 
#19-F-CAM Cambodia Program Implementation face-to-face 28.10.2011 
#20-M-ETH Ethiopia Program Implementation face-to-face 28.10.2011 
#14-F-NE Nepal (includes Bhutan) Senior Management Team Skype 18.10.2011 
#8-F-NE Nepal (includes Bhutan) Senior Management Team Skype 21.11.2011 
#17-M-RU Russia Senior Management Team face-to-face 27.10.2011 
#4-F-SEE 
South East Europe                               
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro) 
Senior Management Team Skype 14.09.2011 
#13-F-UG Uganda Finance/Auditing Skype 05.10.2011 
#18-M-UG Uganda Program Implementation face-to-face 28.10.2011 
#23-F-UG Uganda Senior Management Team Skype 20.11.2011 
#21-M-ZIN Zimbabwe Senior Management Team face-to-face 28.10.2011 
S
a
v
e th
e C
h
ild
ren
 N
o
rw
a
y
 
#1-M-NOR Head office Program Implementation face-to-face 31.08.2011 
#2-M-NOR Head office Administration face-to-face 06.09.2011 
#3-M-NOR Head office Program Implementation face-to-face 13.09.2011 
#5-F-NOR Head office Human Resources face-to-face 14.09.2011 
#6-F-NOR Head office Communications face-to-face 15.09.2011 
#7-F-NOR Head office Human Resources face-to-face 16.09.2011 
#9-M-NOR Head office Program Implementation face-to-face 26.09.2011 
#10-F-NOR Head office Program Implementation face-to-face 26.09.2011 
#15-F-NOR Head office Senior Management Team face-to-face 20.10.2011 
#16-F-NOR Head office Emergency Response face-to-face 26.10.2011 
#22-M-NOR Head office Finance/Auditing face-to-face 31.10.2011 
S
C
 
#11-F-SCD SC Denmark Transition to SCI Skype 03.10.2011 
#12-M-SCI SCI Risk Management email questions 04.10.2011 
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4.2.3 Documents 
Although my analysis relies heavily on the interview material, internal 
documents proved fundamental for understanding SCN’s organizational 
structure and operational model. Such documents included standard operating 
procedures, funding applications, cooperation agreements with donors, policy 
and strategy documents, reports and organizational evaluations. Gaining access 
to these documents also allowed me to save time during the interviews, so I 
could focus on the risk-related questions. Except for a few occasional 
difficulties, I was granted access to nearly all the documents I requested; 
indeed, SCN even granted access me to its intranet, where various documents 
and internal communications were stored. With access to the organization’s 
intranet, I did not have to request permission for each individual item I wanted 
to consult.  
4.3 Data analysis 
The analysis began with the transcription of all audio recordings using the 
software HyperTRANSCRIBE
19
. Instead of transcribing the interviews word 
by word, I adopted a selective approach, skipping the “uh's,” the false starts, 
silences, coughs, and sighs. I incorporated notes into the transcriptions in cases 
where the hesitations, non-verbal cues and emotional aspects were especially 
notable.  
All transcriptions were imported into NVivo9
20
, a qualitative data analysis 
software. I read each transcription several times in order to become familiar 
with the material (Agar 1980 cited in Creswell 2007), writing short memos 
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 http://www.researchware.com/products/hypertranscribe.html 
20
 http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx 
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about the data. Following an inductive and iterative process, I assigned codes 
to fragments of interview transcriptions as I went through the material in 
NVivo9. Saldaña (2009:3) defines code as “a word or short phrase that 
symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative 
attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data.”  I carried out 
countless rounds of coding, moving slowly from codes to themes and from the 
descriptive level towards a more analytical level. This was a time-consuming 
process because I needed to explore possible leads, research questions and 
hypotheses. However, it helped me to gain a broad understanding of risk issues 
in SCN. When organizational risk perception had been defined as the main 
focus of research, I conducted another round of coding and analysis based on 
the theoretical framework described in Chapter 2.  
4.4 Ethical considerations 
Three main ethical challenges were encountered in this study: concealing the 
identity of informants; safeguarding the reputation of SCN; and causing 
distress to participant by raising risk issues (Pidgeon et al. 2008). 
4.4.1 Anonymity  
Organizations are relatively small worlds. Even though respondents’ names 
can be replaced by codes, other attributes may reveal their identity to co-
workers (e.g. work location, area of function, job title). In practice, therefore, 
it is hard to ensure complete anonymity in organizational research (Borgatti 
2005). 
In this study, I assigned an identity code to each respondent, with interview 
number, gender, and working location (e.g. #1-M-NOR and #22-F-NE). Given 
the emphasis on situating risk perceptions, it was important to retain the 
information regarding working location. Information about job title was 
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removed, and the gender of respondents was randomly altered to ensure 
greater anonymity.  
4.4.2 Safeguarding the organization  
According to Bulmer (1988:156), researchers have an “obligation in any 
material that is published to safeguard the organization from revelations that 
could be harmful to its commercial activities or its reputation.” This can be 
achieved by either obtaining the approval of the organization prior to 
publication or concealing the organization’s identity as a whole. Both 
alternatives have their shortcomings. Requesting official approval may mean 
that a study will never see the light of the day, if the organization finds it 
inappropriate (ibid.). And anonymizing an entire organization might not be 
possible if the number of similar organizations is small (Healey and Rawlinson 
1993). In both cases, researchers may be forced to renounce on data that are 
relevant for the study, but that could damage the organization’s reputation or 
reveal its identity. 
Faced with this dilemma, I opted to seek for permission from SCN. Therefore, 
this study is submitted to the University of Oslo as a restricted-access master’s 
thesis. It will not be made available for public consultation until I obtain SCN 
approval for this. 
4.4.3 Raising risk issues 
Given its focus on people’s views on risk and experiences, socio-cultural risk 
research can cause distress to some participants. According to Pidgeon et al. 
(2008), raising risk issues with participants may trigger doubts and 
uncertainties about the situation being discussed, especially in the case of 
interviews. This can create anxiety, with repercussions long after fieldwork is 
completed. There is no easy way out of this ethical dilemma. If risk research is 
not explicitly framed as such, that raises questions regarding participants’ 
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informed consent. I opted for being explicit about the study objectives when I 
sought to recruit participants. In addition, during the interviews I emphasized 
that participants were free to withdraw or refuse to answer any questions.      
4.5 Challenges and study limitations 
Although I could have written an entire thesis about the challenges and 
limitations of this study, only three key topics will be discussed in the 
following sections: poor access to respondents; shortcomings of risk research; 
and the problems involved in exploratory case-study design.  
4.5.1 Research access and sampling 
Even though research access to SCN was easily obtained, I struggled to 
establish contacts with country office staff, due to the problem of “layered 
permissions.” As noted by Buchanan and Bryman (2007:490), organizational 
researchers usually cannot approach potential respondents directly. They must 
obtain the permission or assistance from a “senior management gatekeeper.” In 
this study, SCN said I should ask the head office employees who follow up on 
country offices to forward to the various country directors my request to 
interview their staff. Although this procedure worked well, it blocked my 
access to respondents in a few cases. Some of these “head office gatekeepers” 
never responded my emails; some were out of the country throughout my 
fieldwork period; or refused to put me in contact with country offices. As a 
researcher, I often felt as if I had no power. It was important for me to pursue 
potential respondents, but if I was perceived as too “pushy,” I could put my 
own research access at risk. 
To make progress, I had to adopt a convenience sampling strategy and an 
“opportunistic approach.” As noted by Buchanan et al. (1988:55) ensuring 
adequate data collection is important, but “the practice of field research [in 
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organizations] is the art of possible. It is necessary to exploit the opportunities 
offered in the circumstances.” For instance, when I learned by chance that 
employees from several country offices were gathered in Oslo for a meeting, I 
obtained the list of participants and directly approached people from country 
offices I had not yet contacted. In the course of two days, I was able to 
interview employees from four countries.  
Such restrictions on research access have repercussions for the objectives and 
results of this study. Although I treat SCN as the main unit of analysis, my 
sample clearly does not reflect SCN as a whole. Most of my respondents were 
involved with long-term development work. I spoke with only one person who 
works in emergency response and I did not interview anyone from the 
Domestic Programs Department. Consequently, a considerable part of SCN’s 
operations was poorly covered or entirely left outside this study. For that 
reason, the findings presented here cannot and should not be generalized to 
SCN as a whole.   
It should be noted that this sampling problem was not caused solely by access 
restrictions. Conducting an exploratory study is like building an airplane in 
flight. By the time I realized the need to talk to more employees involved in 
emergency response or to investigate perceptions of risk among staff in the 
domestic program, it was already too late to stop, re-design the study, and start 
anew.  
4.5.2 The problem of researching risk  
Henwood et al. (2008) draw attention to the problem of  “risk framing” during 
the research process. That happens when the researcher inadvertently transfers 
his or her own conceptualizations of risk and ideas about what qualifies as 
risky to respondents. Drawing on the relational theory of risk (Boholm and 
Corvellec 2011), the problem could be described as: How do researchers ask 
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participants to identify risks, without imparting to them the researchers’ 
constructions of risk objects, objects at risk, or relationships of risk? 
In this sense, it could be argued that in asking my informants to identify what 
they see as a risk for their organization, I was already constructing SCN as an 
object at risk. It might be questioned whether employees themselves would 
construct the organization as an object at risk without being asked to do so. 
This is a limitation of this study, and of other studies of risk perception. For 
instance, when Corvellec (2010) and Mohamed (2007, 2010) asked employees 
about organizational risks, they were also constructing the case-study 
organizations as objects at risk. And when Lupton and Tulloch (2002a, b, 
2003) asked a group of Australians what they perceived as risks for themselves 
and for their fellow citizens, the researchers were also constructing the 
participants and indeed the population of Australia as objects at risk.  
In fact, if risk has three constitutive elements (risk object, object at risk, and 
relationship of risk) the real question is whether it is at all possible to ask 
people about their views on risk, unless one of these variables is kept constant. 
Therefore, the greatest contribution of the relational theory of risk is to allow 
researchers to reflect upon the risk objects, objects at risk, and risk 
relationships that they might be transferring to their respondents.  
4.5.3 Problems involved in exploratory case-study design 
According to Yin (2003a, b), exploratory case studies are always the prelude to 
“real” research. As such, they cannot produce more than leads, directions, and 
hypotheses for further inquiry.  However, when there is no time or opportunity 
for a subsequent “real study,” researchers are left with a plethora of 
methodological problems. In the following sections, I examine two possible 
weaknesses of this study: poor case-study boundaries; and lack of focus and 
theory. 
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A ‘messy’ case 
Back when SCN managed its own country offices, it was easy to see where the 
organization began and ended. With the Unification process, well underway, 
however, what I found was an organization working hard to juggle three 
different governance systems for coordinating its operations abroad. To 
organize this “organizational mess,” I used a financial criterion to determine 
what counted or not as “SCN:” I considered all country offices that receive a 
substantial part of their budgets from SCN as being a part of the organization 
Save the Children Norway. That means that respondents from Nepal and 
Cambodia were treated as SCN employees, even though they technically were 
under SCI. At the time of my fieldwork, SCN had just transferred or was in the 
process of transferring these country offices to the management of SCI.  
As seen in Chapter 3, this meant to some extent putting apples and bananas in 
the same basket. Each county office has its own history and country context, 
and there are countless factors that could influence respondents’ answers. 
Moreover, by grouping country offices then in different stages of the 
unification process (SCN-managed, unified, SCI-managed), I of course was 
not taking into consideration the influence of other SC national organizations 
on the views of my respondents. This is particularly problematic, since several 
interviewees argued that SCN is very different from other sister organizations, 
in terms of organizational culture and management style.  
Lack of focus and theory 
In an exploratory case study, the research problem and theoretical framework 
are often defined along the way (Yin 2003a,b). Although this allows great 
freedom to researchers, it is also a recipe for obtaining incomplete data. In this 
study, asking respondents about what they perceived as risks to their 
organization was only one of the topics explored. This is the reason why some 
quotes from respondents are used more than once throughout the thesis. 
Moreover, without previously delimiting the research problem, I had to 
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identify along the way theories that could help me to make sense of my data. 
When I finally became acquainted with the relational theory of risk (Corvellec 
and Boholm 2011), data collection had already been completed. While 
analyzing the interview transcripts, I realized that I could have made the 
interviews more focused and probed more efficiently if I had selected this 
research problem and this theory right already at the outset, but… 
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5. DECONSTRUCTING RISK  
What do the following have in common: a case of child abuse, misuse of 
funds, the death of an employee, and failure to deliver project outcomes? They 
are all risks to Save the Children Norway, or at least, they are perceived as 
such by its employees (after Giddens 1999:1). In this chapter, I provide an 
account of these and other organizational risks identified by respondents. 
Drawing on Boholm and Corvellec’s (2011) tripartite notion of risk, I will 
deconstruct the risk issues singled out by SCN staff and reveal their 
constitutive elements. Risk objects, objects at risk, and relationships of risk are 
mutually constructed and subject to continuous reinterpretation (Boholm and 
Corvellec 2011). However, a starting point is necessary in order to describe the 
data. To explore how certain objects are framed as valuable and others as 
dangerous, I will describe the relationships of risk constructed by respondents 
from two different angles: first, from the perspective of the risk object; then, 
from the perspective of the object at risk.  
5.1 Risk objects 
Risk objects resemble hazards, as they embody the possibility of causing harm 
to what is considered valuable (Boholm and Corvellec 2011). In their 
examples of organizational risks, most of my respondents constructed four risk 
objects: staff, partners, the host government, and the host country. In the next 
sections, we examine the risk relationships built around each of these objects, 
focusing on how they were constructed as dangerous. 
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5.1.1 Staff 
In their examples of organizational risks, eight respondents (five from head 
office and three from country offices) saw the staff of SCN as a risk object. 
They feared that employees could abuse children, misuse funds, drive 
programs and projects to failure, and jeopardize SCN’s reputation (see Figure 
6).  
Figure 6: Relationships of risk – staff as risk object 
 
Five respondents (four from head office and one from Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
described the occurrence of a case of child abuse or exploitation involving 
SCN personnel as a risk for the organization. Constructing the employee as a 
risk object and the child as an object at risk, respondents imagined a plot 
(Corvellec 2011) in which the implementation of programs carried out by the 
organization could create opportunities for employees to take advantage of 
children. As the respondent from Bosnia-Herzegovina puts it:   
[A] risk with which we are very concerned about is misuse of children. 
Sometimes, it may be by an employee. I’m not necessarily saying us. 
But you can see it in the west coast of Africa, with the UN forces that 
have been misusing young girls for handing out food. (#4-F-SEE) 
Respondents were particularly concerned with cases of sexual abuse. For 
instance, a respondent from head office explained:  
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Risk is also related to what we can or cannot do to children. You see in 
the newspaper from time to time people involved in aid organizations, 
but who have been demanding sexual services from children in big 
programs. So that’s a risk, if anything like that happens. We have to 
ensure that it doesn’t happen, especially related to children. (#10-F-
NOR) 
In constructing the employee as a risk object, another respondent from head 
office suggested that children’s rights organizations such as SCN are an 
obvious target for pedophiles. “There are predators out there, and they are 
looking for opportunities. They are attracted by this kind of organization, 
because it gives them the opportunity to meet children” (#5-F-NOR). This 
respondent also emphasized the importance of having good human resource 
policies and procedures to prevent the organization from hiring “dangerous 
employees.”  
Five respondents (three from head office and one each from Uganda and 
Nepal) constructed relationships of risk involving SCN staff and the results of 
projects and programs implemented by the organization. Two respondents 
from head office spoke of the risk that an employee might leave the 
organization in the middle of the project. That could interrupt or delay the 
implementation of activities, affecting the achievement of planned results. 
Three respondents (one from head office and two from Uganda and Nepal) 
identified a different risk. In their view, SCN faces the risk that plans 
developed by staff have design flaws that could hinder the success of projects 
and programs implemented by the organization. The respondent from Uganda 
explained:  
One of the risks that we identified in some of our projects is the 
continuous use of project strategies that are not effective. We believe 
that there are times where a concept may be brought forward informally 
and turn into a project strategy. But then, when you start implementing 
that project strategy, maybe this turns out to be not appropriate. If you 
don’t go back to the drawing board to correct that project strategy, that 
means that the project staff will continue implementing activities that 
are not going to have the desired outcome. If correcting actions are not 
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taken, the project will come to an end, and by the time the evaluation is 
done it will be discovered that the project never met its objectives and 
unfortunately the project resources have all been lost. (#13-F-UG) 
Five respondents (two from Uganda and three from head office) identified the 
risk of fraud and corruption involving staff members. In doing so, they 
constructed the employee as a source of danger for SCN’s funds. They feared 
that employees might divert funds intended to help beneficiaries, for their 
personal benefit. For instance, a respondent in Oslo said:  
Because there is a distance between us [head office] and them [country 
offices].It could be that there are things happening at the country office, 
[such as] a person abusing power. This person who has some kind of 
power over the financial resources is not using the resources in the best 
possible way. (#1-M-NOR) 
A respondent from Uganda noted that some areas of the organization are more 
vulnerable to fraud and corruption:  
It has mainly to do with procurement. Procurement is the main area. 
Another area is construction. When we build schools, we spend quite 
some money on having schools up to the standards. Given the amount 
of money that we use on construction, I think this could be an area of 
risk for us. (#23-F-UG) 
Children, funds, and results were not the only valuable objects that could be 
endangered by the actions of SCN personnel. Nearly all respondents who 
mentioned the risks of child abuse, fraud, and corruption also constructed 
SCN’s reputation as an object at risk. As a respondent from head office 
argued:  
We face, for instance, a risk in Norway too, to our reputation. If an 
employee working with SC does something wrong, which puts the light 
of the media on that person, that might also endanger the whole 
organization, the willingness to donate money to us. (#5-F-NOR)   
 73 
5.1.2 Partners 
SCN has gradually moved away from self-implementation of programs 
towards working with partners in the South, such as governmental agencies 
and local NGOs (Kruse et al. 2009). Even though partnership is a key working 
principle for SCN, 13 respondents (nine from country offices and four from 
head office) argued that working with partners can be a risky business. In their 
examples of organizational risk, respondents described relationships of risk in 
which partners could misappropriate funds or compromise the achievement of 
planned results (see Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Relationships of risk – partners as risk object 
 
Nine respondents (two from head office and seven from country offices in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nepal, Russia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) argued that 
whenever SCN supports local partners financially, there is a risk of losing 
funds through fraud or corruption. For instance, a respondent from Nepal 
stressed the risk of corruption involving governmental partners:  
We, by Nepalese law, have to work through local NGOs and through 
the government. So, we can choose, we can work with both of them or 
one of them. We tend to work with both, because we want to influence 
government policy and procedures. Yet, at the same time, there’s a lot 
of corruption in the government around finances, so we can have more 
control, which is the word, in working with NGOs to ensure that funds 
go to communities. (#14-F-NE) 
As a result, SCN must be careful when providing financial resources to 
partners, as a respondent from Bosnia-Herzegovina explained:   
If we have a brand-new partner, particularly an NGO, we start with 
them slowly and let them prove themselves. This is something we also 
do with the government. Then, when things are going well we can 
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increase the risk by doing more risky things, more innovation and 
higher level of financing. (#4-F-SEE) 
Four respondents from country offices in Ethiopia, Nepal, and Uganda 
constructed another object at risk: the results of project and programs 
implemented through Southern partners. If partners lack capacity or 
commitment, they argued, this could delay or interrupt the implementation of 
programs, putting the achievement of expected results at stake. In fact, one 
respondent from Uganda suggested that partnership is inherently risky. 
Although SCN relies on local partners to implement most of its programs, the 
organization does not have control over them. He said: 
A risk... I would say…it is the partnership mode. It’s very nice but it 
also has its challenges. I would say that 90 percent of what we do is 
through partners, and yet we don’t really have that much control over 
what the partners do. So, if the partner chooses to run the program 
funded by someone else and keeps yours aside, you can only say: “Hey 
guys, what’s happening? We need to move on.” But if they are not 
really up to it, you’re stuck; and that doesn’t reflect well on us. So, in 
that sense, I see it as a risk. (#18-M-UG) 
To reduce partnerships risks, all country offices have adopted procedures 
intended to prevent the selection of the wrong partners. “We look for possible 
risks” (#17-M-RU), as a respondent from Russia explained it. Interestingly, a 
respondent from head office argued that SCN “plays safe,” as the organization 
tends to work with well-established partners. She explained: 
I think we should maybe take more risks than we do in terms of 
partnerships. If you look at the partners we have, they are quite 
established and we have been working with them for quite some time. 
We do know that they have adequate financial systems. We do know 
that they have adequate governance systems. So they are safe. They are 
not too risky to work with. We also know that they deliver on the 
program side. (#15-F-NOR) 
This respondent went on to say that working with partners may come into 
conflict with finance management standards expected of SCN, and that creates 
dilemmas for the organization. As she saw it, selecting a grassroots partner 
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may allow SCN to reach its target group, but it also entails a higher risk of 
funds being lost. She said: 
If you really want to look at grassroots and civil society, you will then 
have to work with partners that do not know much about finance 
systems and do not have a proper governance system. But they might do 
a hell of a good work for young people. So, it is always this dilemma. 
There are constant dilemmas in this type of work: the ideology one has, 
versus the demand for control. Controlling the risks, if you like, it’s 
constant. (#15-F-NOR) 
Another dilemma involving partners described by this respondent had to do 
with control and autonomy. On one hand, SCN is required by its donors to 
control the funds provided to partners. On the other hand, SCN is expected to 
encourage local ownership and give autonomy to Southern partners.  She 
explained:  
How can you be sure unless you follow up the partners closely? You’re 
supposed to develop civil society (...) and give them the freedom to 
develop their own organization. At the same time you’re asked to 
control the money you support them with (…). So it’s a dilemma. (#15-
F-NOR) 
5.1.3 The host country 
The host country was one of the most prominent risk objects singled out by 
respondents: 17 respondents (eight from head office and nine from various 
country offices) described the developing and transition countries in which 
SCN operates as “risky places.” They were depicted as countries where the 
results of programs, funds, and the safety of SCN personnel are endangered by 
political instability, inflation, natural disasters, systemic corruption, and 
insecurity (see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Relationships of risk – host country as risk object 
 
Twelve respondents (seven from head office and five from country offices) 
argued that the security situation in the host countries is a source of danger to 
SCN. Although some interviewees provided examples of risk in which the 
organization’s property or the implementation of programs were at stake, 
nearly all respondents focused on the safety and well-being of staff. For 
instance, a respondent from head office said:  
It needs to be recognized that SC works in some of the most difficult 
situations in the world, like in the middle of Afghanistan (...). And then 
you are inevitably taking a risk in just being in there, maybe on the lives 
of your own staff. (#10-F-NOR)  
Respondents established various relationships of risk involving staff and the 
security situation in the host country: from employees falling victim to 
common crime, to being caught in the middle of a violent demonstration. A 
respondent from Zimbabwe expanded on the range of possible risks:  
I mean, it is security at different levels. There is safety and security in 
terms of personal theft, armed robbery, rape, that kind of security. But 
then there’s also political violence, which at this point is not an issue. 
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But if elections are tomorrow, there is likely to be intimidation. There is 
likely to be violence associated with the parties. (…) So I think for us in 
Zimbabwe, the risk is surely the potential for politically related violence 
and then the usual, like road safety. Actually this is currently our biggest 
concern. We had several accidents this year. (#21-M-ZIN) 
A respondent from head office also noted that the risk of staff being harmed in 
car accidents is high: “Statistically, the most dangerous thing for us is car 
accidents, people getting killed in the traffic. It is not only for us, but for all 
NGOs and the UN as well.” (#7-F-NOR) 
Five respondents (three from the head office and two from Uganda) identified 
the systemic corruption in some countries where SCN operates as a risk for the 
organization, and mentioned funds as an object at risk. A respondent from 
head office noted: “We are working in many countries which are very difficult 
in relation to transparency and corruption” (#10-F-NOR). Another respondent, 
also from Oslo, spoke of “[countries] where gifts and kickbacks are a normal 
part of the economy” (#15-F-NOR). In the respondents’ view, widespread 
corruption in the host country indicates that there is a higher risk of funds 
being misused by country office or partner personnel. A respondent from 
Uganda said:  
Uganda is maybe one of the most corrupt countries in the world (…) A 
number of our ministries [in the government] have been caught in 
extreme involvement in corruption cases. For us, that is a good indicator 
that corruption is indeed happening at higher levels. Therefore, the 
likelihood of other people trying to emulate that is quite high. (#23-F-
UG) 
Seven respondents (two from head office and five from country offices in 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nepal, and Uganda) established relationships of risk 
between the host country and the results of SCN’s programs and projects. 
Depending on their working context, they tended to highlighted one main 
characteristic of the host country in their examples of risk, be it the political 
situation, security, inflation or vulnerability to natural disasters. Six 
respondents constructed the political situation in the host country as a possible 
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threat to the achievement of results. Some of them argued that political 
instability could slow or even interrupt projects and programs that are 
implemented in partnership with the government. Two respondents mentioned 
the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where an education project fell behind 
schedule because even one year after the elections no government had yet been 
formed. A respondent from Nepal provided an example of how a decision 
about the location of a project was made on the basis of an assessment of the 
country’s political situation. She said: 
We were running a project that is funded by our sponsorship program 
(...) There was a plan to exit from one area and concentrate the project 
in only one location. (…) But when we analyzed the country situation 
we felt that it would be too risk for us to run the program in only one 
site. (…). If something happens in that location, we cannot operate the 
program here in Nepal, so the whole project would stop. So, realizing 
this risk we developed an understanding that we should have two 
different sites. (#8-F-NE) 
This example also demonstrates that perceptions of risk are a driving force of 
organizational actions. 
In addition to political instability, four respondents identified the occurrence of 
natural disasters as a risk to the achievement of planned results. For instance, a 
respondent from head office noted that a natural disaster could interrupt the 
implementation of education projects because schools are often used as 
shelters during emergencies. He explained: 
The country offices in Asia are just constantly faced with natural 
disasters (…). So, from their perspective, (…) you might have a 
fantastically well-planned educational program that is going to get more 
out-of-school children into the school. Then, as it happened last year in 
Pakistan with the floods, suddenly all the available schools became 
shelters. That is a risk, of course. Because what is going to happen to 
the kids that were supposed to go to those schools? They can’t go there 
anymore because there are adults living there. When people think about 
natural disasters, they think immediately of people losing their homes 
and their livelihood. But for us in SC, we’ve got to think about that. 
Usually when disasters happen, schools are the first place people go for 
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shelter or they are turned into distribution centers. Then, it stops the 
education of the kids. That’s a very big risk in certain countries (#9-M-
NOR) 
Natural disasters in the host country were not the only threat to program 
implementation. A respondent from Ethiopia mentioned that inflation could 
hamper the implementation of programs and projects: 
The other risk is the inflation that pops up every now and then in project 
proposals and in the annual plan. You know your budget for the project 
period, which means that you know how much you can spend each year. 
But inflation is high in Ethiopia these days. So, you can’t do what you 
planned given the inflation. (…). If you want to engage in activities 
which require a huge sum of money, it may mean that you’ll have to cut 
some of your activities or reconsider the number of people that will be 
involved in the training, for instance. (#20-M-ETH) 
In addition, two respondents noted that the security situation the host country 
could lead to the destruction of infrastructure constructed by SCN (e.g. 
schools) or interrupt the implementation of ongoing projects. The latter is 
exemplified by a respondent from Uganda, who said:  
(…) for that project in Northern Uganda [Safe return and reintegration 
of war-affected children], the risk is that the war could break out again. 
We have had a bit of calm for some time. But there’s a potential risk 
that security is in question, and you cannot do anything. So, there’s a 
much bigger problem. (#18-M-UG) 
The construction of the host country as dangerous is noteworthy, since it is the 
very rationale that justifies SCN’s actions. As a rule, all funding applications 
to which I had access began with an analysis the country context, highlighting 
the risks to which children are exposed. For instance, a funding application 
submitted by the Country Office Nepal to the Royal Norwegian Embassy in 
Kathmandu states:  
Discrimination, early marriage, trafficking, sexual abuse and 
exploitation, child labour, abduction and recruitment into armed groups 
and armed force are some of the most prevalent concerns impeding 
child protection in Nepal (…).Root causes of this abuse, exploitation 
and violence are power imbalances, especially due to gender 
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inequalities, harmful traditional practices, a weak child protection 
system, internal conflict and inadequate implementation of laws and 
policies (SCN 2010c:13) 
Moreover, SCN’s Strategy 2010–2013 indicates that the construction of host 
countries as dangerous places plays a role in building the organization’s image: 
Save the Children Norway’s brand and position in Norway is based on 
trust, influence and the ability to attract funds. We will strengthen our 
position by: (…) showing that we are working in the countries with the 
greatest need and with those children in the most difficulty, often those 
who are hardest to reach (SCN 2009:8).  
5.1.4 The host government 
SCN engages with a range of governmental agencies at the national and local 
levels in implementing programs and projects for children. These include 
ministries of education, health and justice; human rights institutions with 
statutory powers; judges; police and social welfare institutions. As a 
respondent from the head office remarked: “It is a little bit unique in the SC 
family that we are the ones that work with governments. Not everybody does 
that” (#9-M-NOR). However, as many respondents noted, the host government 
can be a risky player to deal with. Thirteen respondents (six from head office 
and seven from various country offices) provided examples of risks in which 
the host government was constructed as a potential source of danger to the 
results of programs, funds, staff and SCN as an organization (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Relationships of risk – host government as risk object 
 
Six respondents (two from head office and four from country offices in 
Ethiopia, Cambodia, Nepal, and Uganda) identified the introduction of new 
regulations on NGOs by the host government as a risk for SCN, since that 
could restrict the organization’s capacity to operate in the country. In their 
construction of the host government as a risk object, two respondents from 
Cambodia and Nepal observed that SCN does not have control over the 
government actions toward NGOs. The respondent from Nepal said:  
As an external organization, we have no political influence, or way of 
protecting ourselves from changes in government policy towards 
INGOs, really… The only people that actually support us are the 
bilateral donors, meaning the embassies (…). Those who are interested 
in development, they may defend us, to some extent. But there could be 
restrictions placed on us by the governments. They may say that you 
can’t use certain type of funding or that all funding should go through 
the government (…). That’s one risk. (#14-F-NE) 
Three respondents mentioned the case of Ethiopia, where this risk became 
reality when the government adopted the Charities and Societies Proclamation 
Law in 2009. NGOs that receive more than ten percent of their income from 
foreign sources are no longer allowed to engage in human rights and advocacy 
activities in Ethiopia. According to two respondents from head office, the 
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introduction of stricter regulations on NGOs ranks high on the political agenda 
of several countries. As one respondent explained,  
[This] has to do with a paradigm shift in some countries where they say: 
“Hang on a minute; we don’t want western NGOs dictating how our 
human right legislations are going to be.” Perhaps, in some case, 
governments are getting worried (…) because the civil society and our 
work are always linked to the opposition in many countries. (#9-M-
NOR) 
Four respondents (two from head office and two from Cambodia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina) argued that working with the host government could pose a risk 
to the achievement of expected results.  In their view, elections bring the risk 
of staff turnover in the government, which could delay or even interrupt 
projects implemented in partnership with governmental agencies. As the 
respondent from Cambodia explained:  
(…) and some risks are related to the authorities. For example, we have 
a project with the local government. But then, election comes and they 
change personnel. (…) And then, when the new employees arrive, they 
need to obtain orientations from the national government and they have 
no time to continue the operations with us. So, our activities may stop. 
(#19-F-CAM) 
A respondent from Ethiopia argued that lack of capacity or commitment of 
governmental partners could delay program implementation: 
Their main duty [government staff] is to deliver whatever is given to 
them by their bosses, the authorities.  They have a lot of things on their 
table. They give preference and priority of implementing what they are 
supposed to do, what they get paid for. So, sometimes, it happens that 
[SCN’s] projects and plans are executed late. (…) That’s because of 
capacity; the necessary human resources are not in place; or 
commitment. It could be for different reasons. It depends from one 
partner to another. (#20-M-ETH) 
Of the nine respondents who identified partners as source of risk to SCN’s 
funds (see section 5.1.2), two respondents, from Uganda and Nepal, 
emphasized that cooperating with governmental agencies entails the risk that 
project funds may be misused by the authorities. The respondent from Uganda 
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explained that her country office has decided to stop supporting governmental 
partners financially: 
We have previously cooperated with governmental departments. But 
because of so much corruption, the people out in the field, they all 
recommended that we stop giving money to governmental partners. We 
can have them as a partner in other ways, but our relationship should 
not involve transfer of money. The management [i.e. country director] 
has especially adopted this position. (#13-F-UG) 
Four respondents (two from head office and two from Uganda) spoke of the 
risks involved in openly criticizing the host government. According to 
respondents, two objects at risk could be affected by a negative response from 
the government to an advocacy campaign: SCN as an organization, and the 
safety of staff.  Three respondents mentioned that speaking out against 
violations of children’s rights or corruption could trigger hostile reactions from 
the government, culminating with SCN’s being force to leave the country. Two 
respondents from head office argued that working in a country where INGOs 
are perceived as political enemies or where advocacy work is prohibited entails 
a choice between helping beneficiaries on the ground, and raising the SCN’s 
voice against violations. One of them explained:   
You work there under this frame and you keep a low profile when it 
comes to political issues; or you choose to not work in the country and 
raise your voice. (…) It’s not that we are not critical. But since our 
choice is to be there and work with the people that are our target group, 
that is the choice we make. That is why we have to be careful (…). If 
you are somewhere, you have to work under that frame; otherwise you 
are just kicked out. (#15-F-NOR)  
Another respondent from head office added that SCN personnel in the country 
could be the target of violence as a result of speaking out against violations: 
“all country offices have national staff and they cannot leave the ground when 
things get bad”. (#6-F-NOR)  
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5.2 Objects at risk 
Objects at risk are considered valuable and worth protecting (Corvellec 2010, 
Boholm and Corvellec 2011). They serve as the background against which risk 
relationships are constructed, since “there is no risk unless something of value 
is considered to be at stake” (Corvellec 2010:145). In the examples provided 
by respondents, five objects were perceived as being “at risk”: staff, children, 
reputation, funds, and the results of projects and programs. As one respondent 
noted: “There are so many different types of risk. You know, it depends on 
what you think is put at risk, isn’t it? So, you have risk to personnel; you have 
risk to a project; risk to people [beneficiaries] or risk to reputation” (#16-F-
NOR). In the following sections, I describe the risk relationships built around 
each of these objects, focusing on how they were constructed as valuable.  
It should be noted that the interview material on objects at risk was somewhat 
less rich. There is something self-evident about objects at risk, as most 
respondents did not feel the need to explain why they saw staff, children, 
reputation, funds, and the results of programs as being valuable. Interestingly, 
when I asked respondents about what risks SCN should not take, they 
proceeded to explain why these objects were valuable or deserved to be 
protected. Another reason for lack of data is that I had not designed the 
interview questionnaire in light of the relational theory of risk (Boholm and 
Corvellec 2011), as I was not familiar with it at that stage.  
5.2.1 Staff 
According to Boholm and Corvellec (2011), no object is inherently risky or 
valuable. On the contrary, different identities can be granted to the same 
object, depending on the context and the person asked. This is the case with 
“staff,” which was constructed both as a risk object and an object at risk by 
respondents. On one hand, employees could put children, funds, and SCN’s 
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reputation at stake. On the other hand, they could get hurt on the job, even 
killed. In total, 12 respondents (eight from head office and three from country 
offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe) provided examples 
of risks in which SCN personnel were identified as an object at risk (see 
Figure 10).  
Figure 10: Relationships of risk – staff as an object at risk 
 
Nearly all of these respondents singled out the host country as a source of 
danger to SCN staff. They saw employees as being exposed to a range of 
perils: car accidents, kidnapping, theft, murder, political arrest, etc. As a 
respondent from Bosnia-Herzegovina said: “Another risk factor here is also 
personal risk, that could be either war or... driving in the roads in the Balkans 
even that is a risk in itself.” (#4-F-SEE)  
Objects at risk are usually constructed around ideas of “value, loss, 
vulnerability and need for protection” (Boholm and Corvellec 2011:180). The 
latter was stressed by a respondent from head office, who spoke of the 
importance of risk management in SCN: 
There are two levels to it [importance of risk management]. One is staff, 
our own staff. I mean, they need to be protected. So, there’s always this 
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issue of when to withdraw or all those management issues, which is of 
course absolutely important. We need to protect staff! (#3-M-NOR)  
SCN’s responsibility to safeguard staff is also specifically mentioned in the 
organization’s Human Resources Policy (SCN 2007a:5)  
In the case where external risks and threats could cause serious injury or 
even death of personnel on duty, SCN has a special responsibility to 
evaluate the risks staff members are exposed to, and to seek to reduce or 
eliminate such risks. 
However, as noted by #3-M-NOR and two other head office employees, there 
is a tension between the responsibility to protect staff and SCN’s mandate to 
act in the best interests of children:  
If we consider risk very strictly to be threats towards health or security, 
then we [SCN] like everybody else in this sector are very vulnerable to 
war and humanitarian crises. We want to be there, but they are also the 
most risky situations (#3-M-NOR).  
According to another respondent, SCN often encounters a similar dilemma in 
advocacy work:  
We will do what we can to save children’s lives, sometimes even if that 
means going about our work very carefully and quietly. But other times, 
realizing the need to speak out if massive violations of children’s rights 
are taking place, (...) but you really need to take in consideration the 
personal safety of people. All [country] offices have national staff and 
national staff cannot leave the ground when the things get bad. (#10-F-
NOR) 
5.2.2 Funds 
In their examples of organizational risks, 14 respondents (seven from head 
office and seven from country offices) constructed funds as an object at risk. 
Most of them spoke of the possibility of cases of corruption and fraud 
involving SCN’s employees or local partners, especially in countries where 
corruption is pervasive. However, some employees also mentioned the risk of 
lack of funding. In total, respondents constructed six risk objects: staff, 
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partners, the host country, the host government, the transition to SCI, and SC 
national organizations (see Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Relationships of risk – funds as an object at risk 
 
Five respondents (three from head office and two from Nepal and Uganda) 
were concerned with the risk of not being able to obtain funds to run the 
organization. Two employees from head office established relationships of risk 
between SCN’s capacity to raise funds in Norway and the transition of country 
offices to SCI management. They feared that donors might stop making 
donations if they disapproved of the merger or stopped seeing SCN as a 
Norwegian organization. As one respondent explained: 
We are a Norwegian organization. Our name is Redd Barna and it has 
been for 65 years. It will stay so, that’s what we think. If SCI says that 
everyone has to be called SC-Norway, SC-Sweden or whatever — I 
don’t think that will happen — but there is a risk that in our domestic 
marketing we will lose that feeling that we are a Norwegian 
organization. (...). If our donors feel that SCN is part of some 
international global “thing” that they don’t understand, many will stop 
donating money. The same exercise applies to Norad and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. To get them to understand that there is an added 
value in giving money to Redd Barna and not directly to SCI; that there 
is an added value in having staff in Oslo, if we are all working through 
one program unit. (#6-F-NOR) 
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Looking at funding problems from the perspective of country offices, three 
respondents identified a reduction in the amount of funds channeled by SCN 
and other SC organizations as a risk. A respondent from Nepal explained: 
One of the main risks could be if the funding level decreases drastically.  
As the major portion of SC Nepal funding comes from different SC 
members, if they withdraw their support this will have a significant 
effect on the on-going programs of SC Nepal. (#8-F-NE) 
In constructing funds as an object at risk, six respondents explicitly mentioned 
one of the following: the vulnerability of funds; SCN’s moral responsibility to 
put donations to a good use; and donors’ accountability requirements and 
sanctions applied to NGOs in case of misuse of funds. Respondents who 
emphasized the vulnerability of funds to fraud or corruption tended to stress 
that the host country and its government are corrupt. As a respondent from 
head office argued:  
If you look at Afghanistan, the risk is that it can be pretty far from 
Kabul to some of those local partners in village X, in a country where 
gifts and kickbacks are a normal part of the economy. (...) There is a 
very high risk, actually. You only need one or two corrupt people in that 
chain of money-or-services transferring to have something corrupt 
happening. (#15-F-NOR) 
Another respondent from head office emphasized the moral character of 
SCN’s mission. She said:  
We should have zero tolerance to the exploitation or abuse of children, 
since they are our target group. The same applies to financial 
transactions. We should be good stewards of the resources that we’re 
using. (#10-F-NOR) 
Other respondents focused on donors’ accountability requirements. For 
example, a respondent from head office argued: “The standards that are 
required of us are phenomenon. (...) We have to provide traceable information 
on almost every single Norwegian crown that flows through our system.” (#9-
M-NOR) Another employee, from Uganda, added:  
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We are required by the donors to report even on suspicions sometimes, 
not just any fraud that has happened. We are supposed to report on 
suspicions, even if it proves that that suspicion is not correct. Right 
now, all the donors… USAID is asking us to report on any fraud almost 
right away… Norad is asking us to report on this right away. (#23-F-
UG) 
Three respondents from Oslo explained that the Norad and the MFA can apply 
sanctions against SCN in case of financial irregularities. They criticized the 
Norwegian government’s zero-tolerance policy on corruption, arguing that it 
transfers all liability to the grant recipient if something goes wrong. One of 
these respondents said:  
We need to report to the donors that we have a suspicion of fraudulent 
actions. So, if it turns out that the money stolen was from Norad, then, 
we need to pay that back to Norad. (...) We are discussing a lot with 
Norad and MFA now, and we’ve been doing that for the last eight years 
at least.  If the MFA asks us to do work in a country that is among the 
top ten most corrupt countries in the world, then, they need to 
understand that both of us have to take that risk. It’s not just SCN that 
has to take that risk. (...) We have not yet managed to come to that point 
that MFA and Norad will share the risk with us. They still say that the 
risk is only on our side. (#22-M-NO) 
Another respondent pointed out an inconsistency in donor behavior: donors 
expect SCN to have good control systems to prevent corruption, but at the 
same time to have low overheads. This creates a dilemma for SCN:   
That’s one of the big paradoxes. On one hand you’re asked to work in 
those countries. You’d like to work in those areas because that’s where 
people have the most need, but at the same time they are the most risky. 
The paradox is that you’re asked to keep your administrative costs at the 
lowest level. At the same time, if you really want to make sure that the 
funds really reach its target group, and are implemented properly you 
have to have a lot of control mechanisms; and those control 
mechanisms are expensive. So that’s always a dilemma that you need to 
take into consideration. (#15-F-NOR) 
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5.2.3 Results 
During the interviews, SCN’s employees were particularly concerned about the 
achievement of planned results. In their examples of organizational risks, 14 
respondents (six from head office and eight from country offices) depicted the 
results of programs and projects implemented by SCN as an object at risk. 
Although the perceived sources of danger varied, the relationships of risk 
involved one of the following outcomes: temporary or permanent interruption 
of activities, delays, overspending, and reduction of project size or scope.   
Most respondents provided examples of risk in which the host country, the 
host government, partners and staff posed a threat to programs. However, a 
few of them constructed different risk objects, such as innovation and funds 
(see Figure 12). Two respondents, from Ethiopia and Russia, argued that 
innovation is inherently risky. When SCN implements innovative programs 
and projects for children, there will always be a risk of failing to deliver the 
expected results. The respondent from Ethiopia explained:  
When you want to try something new, there’s risk involved in it. It may 
not work. (…) The fact that it’s new poses a challenge in itself. So, 
while you encourage your partners to try something new, it is likely that 
risk will be there, risk of not being successful. (#20-M-ETH) 
Interestingly, a respondent from head office provided an example in which the 
availability of funds could pose a risk to the results of programs and projects 
implemented by SCN. In his view, accepting funds for a project in a thematic 
area where SCN does not have expertise could lead to failure, as well as 
compromising other ongoing initiatives. He argued: 
If we see that there is a donor that has a great amount of money and 
requires a certain focus that would take resources from ongoing 
projects; or that requires focus on a thematic area where we do not have 
expertise, I would be more reluctant to say yes. Even though I see that 
there’s a great need [for beneficiaries]. I’m not sure if it is worth it. 
Because if we get the funds, but we cannot deliver and we’re not good 
at it, it is not within our core competences, what is the point of 
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receiving those funds? That’s actually something that I had on Russia. 
The Minister of Justice wanted us to do something which is not totally 
out of scope, but outside our core competence and expertise, and it was 
not what we wanted to do and it was not in line with our strategies. 
Then I said: No, thank you. Even though we lost a big potential donor 
on that. We’ve been supported by them for many years, but since 2009 
or 2010 we stopped receiving that funding. (...) If you risk being less 
focused, if you risk not doing what you’re good at, then, it is not worth 
it. (#1-M-NOR) 
Therefore, even a valuable object such as funds can be constructed as a source 
of danger under certain circumstances. This example of risk also reveals a 
tension between delivering on results and securing access to funding: SCN 
prioritized results, but lost the financial support of the donor.  
Figure 12: Relationships of risk – results as an object at risk 
 
To construct results as an object at risk, two employees from head office 
argued that achieving results is important for the Norwegian state donors. For 
instance, one of them declared: “Norad is very tough on results” (#15-F-NOR). 
The other respondent explained that SCN has committed to thoroughly 
document results achieved in order to secure a more flexible agreement with 
Norad:  
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It is more flexible. In the sense that we’ve sort of passed a test—we 
could call it a test—that we’ve delivered reports to their satisfaction. So 
now they’ve given us the core agreement, which means that we deliver 
very small applications and very small annual reports. But every fifth 
year it is the opposite. It is very strict on how to document results in 
order to continue that kind of agreement. It gives flexibility, but they do 
expect a lot of us in terms of documenting results. (#3-M-NOR) 
Nevertheless, seven respondents justified the importance of achieving results 
on the basis of SCN’s mandate to act “in the best interests of children” (#4-F-
SEE). For instance, a respondent from Nepal explained that one of the main 
risks involved in implementing projects is to have a bad design, as that could 
hinder the capacity to benefit children. She argued:  
The real risks lies there, if the project is poorly designed, insufficient 
budget, or wrong staffing levels, etc. It’s difficult to turn it around. It 
can be turned around, in negotiation with donors. “We got some design 
mistakes here and we need to change it.” But it slows the project down. 
It may mean that we realize after six months or a year that we need to 
re-adjust things. That means we’re not benefiting children as effectively 
as if we have done better on the design. (#14-F-NE) 
The importance of delivering results for the beneficiaries’ sake was also 
highlighted by a respondent from head office:  
So, of course, imagine the consequences for the people involved, 
partners and the beneficiaries if we do not manage to deliver due to 
some risk (...). Of course, our reason for being is that we manage to 
deliver (#3-M-NOR).  
Similarly, a respondent from Bosnia-Herzegovina emphasized that delivering 
on results is what justifies SCN’s existence. She argued: “We are here as an 
organization to add value to the chain, to the processes. So, that we can justify 
why we are here and we can improve the situation for children” (#4-F-SEE). 
Interestingly, the achievement of results was also the background against 
which many respondents defined the concept of risk. For instance, when asked 
“What is risk?” a respondent from head office replied: “Not being able to do 
what you promised to do, basically, in relation to our business. So, if you say 
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that you can do something as SC, you better be able to do it” (#10-F-NOR). 
And a respondent from Bosnia-Herzegovina defined risk as: “[U]nwanted 
results or consequences of what we have planned or what we have promised 
the donors to achieve” (#4-F-SEE). 
5.2.4 Children 
As a children’s rights organization, SCN envisions “a world in which every 
child attains the right to survival, protection, development and participation” 
(SCN 2009:2). In the pursuit of this vision, the organization engages with 
children through long-term development programs, emergency response, and 
advocacy work. Despite the good intentions, the interaction between SCN and 
beneficiaries might also cause harm to the latter. In their examples of 
organizational risks, seven respondents (five from head office and two from 
country offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia) constructed children as 
an object at risk. In their view, SCN’s target group was vulnerable to the 
misconduct of staff members and to adverse consequences of programs and 
activities carried out by the organization (see Figure 13). 
Figure 13: Relationships of risk – children as an object at risk 
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Five respondents provided examples of risks in which SCN staff could put the 
well-being of children in jeopardy. Their main concern was sexual abuse, 
which was described as “extremely serious” (#15-F-NOR) and “the worst case 
for SCN” (#22-M-NO). As a respondent from head office said:  
The worst that can happen is that children are getting abused. That’s 
really a high risk. (...) It’s high because of the children’s lives after that 
has happen. Maybe a person abuses children. That’s really the worst 
case for SCN. It’s not that bad if the same person steals NOK 1000 
from the cash box. (#22-M-NO)  
Another respondent from head office mentioned that cases of child abuse 
could also involve local partners that implement projects on SCN’s behalf: 
The Child Safeguarding Protocol is a very serious aspect of the country 
offices because they have a lot of partners. They have to follow up all 
the partners as well. This should be put into the agreements for the 
partners: comply and following the same rules and precautions, (…) just 
like we do. (#5-F-NOR)    
Most respondents who mentioned the risk of children being abused by staff 
members argued that it would have other severe consequences for SCN, such 
as loss of members, funding, and reputation.  
Three respondents singled out yet another risk object: the programs and 
projects implemented by SCN. In their view, children could be affected in two 
ways: they could get hurt while participating in project activities; and they 
could suffer harm or retaliation for their involvement with the organization. 
For instance, a respondent from head office noted that children and their 
families could suffer reprisals for being involved in projects that deal with 
culturally-controversial topics. He said: 
Culturally... What are the obstacles? Which risks do we run when we try 
to challenge a child-harmful traditional practice? What is the risk for 
those involved, children and communities? What do they risk by 
helping us? (#3-M-NOR) 
 95 
A respondent from Cambodia argued that children could suffer retaliation 
from their families or the government for voicing their opinion through SCN’s 
advocacy campaigns. She observed: 
We conduct advocacy activities and we involve children in these 
activities. So, we need to think about their safety. It is a risk. It could be, 
for instance, that they’ll have problems with their family. It could be 
they’ll have problems with the local authorities. It could be that they’ll 
have problems with the government. That’s why we think about the 
risks, which risks could happen to the children if they are involved in 
our activities. (#19-F-CAM)  
The same respondent mentioned that children could encounter threats on their 
way to participate in SCN activities: 
If they are involved in our activities, it could be risky. Like, they could 
go missing or suffer an accident along the road. So, there’s the risk for 
the security of the children. So, when we see that risk, we need to 
consider a way to mitigate the risk. For example, when we conduct a 
meeting at one place, we need to find out the exact place where children 
feel safe. Also, if the children come from other areas and it could be 
risky along the road, so we need to have an adult accompanying the 
children or maybe have our staff to bring the children. (…) But actually 
during that time, there’s another risk, that the adult might abuse the 
children. There is that kind of risk, even with the closest person to the 
child, like the father or an uncle. (#19-F-CAM) 
In their construction of children as an object at risk, five respondents invoked 
the moral character of SCN’s mission. A respondent from head office argued 
that protecting children as an essential aspect of the organization’s ethic code: 
We have to take some risks, but there’s a bottom line. We should not 
risk the safety and well-being of children and we should not, of course, 
risk our staff. I think that’s the ultimate risk that we need to stop if that 
happens. Of course, it’s our ethical standard. (#3-M-NOR)   
Another respondent, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, stressed SCN’s commitment 
to the third article of the UN the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
states that the best interests of children should be a primary consideration in all 
actions concerning to them. This respondent argued: “For us it is an overall 
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principle that whatever we do, it should be in the interests of children. For me 
that’s also a very leading guideline for managing risks or problems” (#4-F-
SEE). Consequently, as an employee from head office said, “we [SCN] should 
have zero tolerance of exploitation or abuse of children, since they are our 
target group” (#10-F-NOR).  
When discussing risks to children, two respondents emphasized the intrinsic 
vulnerability of children. A respondent from head office explained:   
Our soft spot is that we work with children. They need more protection 
than adults. We have an extra responsibility to protect children. (…)We 
should not risk the safety and well-being of children. (#3-M-NOR)  
Interestingly, the construction of children as an object at risk is the very 
rationale of SCN’s existence and actions. SCN’s Strategy 2010-2013 begins 
with a statement about the perils to which children are exposed in the world: 
Every year more than nine million children below the age of five will 
die, largely from preventable causes. 75 million children will grow up 
without education and millions of children will have their most basic 
rights breached in that they will become victims of abuse, neglect, 
violence and exploitation (SCN 2009:1).  
5.2.5 Reputation 
In their examples of organizational risks, nine respondents (six from head 
office and three from country offices) constructed SCN’s reputation as an 
object at risk. They were especially concerned with how donors, the general 
public in Norway and children perceive the organization. Respondents felt that 
almost anything that could go wrong with the organization would have a 
negative effect on SCN’s reputation. The organization could acquire a bad 
reputation if employees misbehave, if programs and project are not successful, 
if funds are misused, if beneficiaries are harmed, if administrative costs get too 
high.  
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SCN’s reputation was “caught in the collateral damage” in several examples of 
organizational risk provided by respondents. Put differently, the organization’s 
image would be affected if other objects at risk were harmed, such as children, 
results, and funds (see Figure 14). However, none of the respondents identified 
risks for SCN staff as a risk for the organization’s reputation. 
Figure 14: Relationships of risk – reputation as an object at risk 
 
Nearly all respondents who mentioned risks for children also emphasized the 
negative consequences for SCN’s reputation as a children’s rights 
organization. Most of them were particularly concerned with child abuse. A 
respondent from head office stated that a case of child abuse involving SCN 
personnel would be even worse than corruption:  
The biggest risk would be examples of child abuse in which it was 
discovered that we didn’t have good enough systems to detect it and 
routines to deal with it. I think that [child abuse] is the major risk to 
SCN’s reputation as a child organization, even worse than corruption 
because corruption is everywhere and everybody knows that there is 
corruption. I think most people also know that there is abuse of children 
[in the aid industry], but it would be devastating for SCN as an 
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organization if we could not document that we have good systems to 
avoid and reduce the risk of child abuse. (#5-F-NOR)  
Another respondent from head office noted that harming a beneficiary would 
be a hard blow to SCN’s reputation because the organization carries the 
responsibility to protect children, as enshrined in its very name. She said: 
Every year we give a huge outdoor concert for children on the 10th of 
December, the Nobel Peace Prize concert for children. There are about 
4000 children. It’s a public concert in front of the city hall. There is a 
tram that goes by. There is the traffic. (...) What would happen if a child 
was seriously hurt, or fell in the sea and drowned? I don’t know. I’m not 
part of that event. But something I know for sure is that it would be 
something we would have to handle really well in order to people to 
understand. Because they’ll say “You went to SCN’s event and you 
drowned. How’s that for saving children’s lives?” So, it’s on our name. 
(#6-F-NOR) 
According to two respondents, reputation is also directly connected to the 
results of programs and projects implemented by SCN. In their view, risks that 
affect the achievement of planned results will also affect SCN’s reputation. As 
a respondent from Uganda summed it up: “You risk a bad reputation if you 
don’t do a project well” (#13-F-UG). A respondent from Bosnia-Herzegovina 
added that delivering on results is especially important for SCN’s image with 
donors:   
I sit here [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and I plan a project for the MFA. I say 
that these are the objectives and results that I would like to propose. (...) 
That’s the reputation of SCN as a whole, and not just us here saying that 
these are the results that we will guarantee or we will strive for. [Risks 
are] also related to project delivery, which is of course important for our 
donors, including the MFA. (#4-F-SEE) 
Two respondents explicitly linked reputation to funds. They argued that cases 
of fraud and corruption could damage SCN’s reputation, especially if 
employees were directly involved. As a respondent from head office 
explained, “If one of our staff members runs off with a lot of money, that’s a 
risk. If we couldn’t prevent that, it would come back to the whole 
organization.” (#10-F-NOR). The relationship between corruption and 
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reputation loss is also emphasized in the SCN Program Handbook (2010e:2): 
“Fraud has a severe negative impact on our organisational culture and on our 
reputation in media and among donors.” 
Two respondents constructed yet another risk object: administration costs. In 
their view, spending a large amount of funds on administration and fundraising 
costs could jeopardize SCN’s reputation, especially with donors. According to 
a respondent from Nepal:  
We may say that our overhead costs are getting too high. Ok, that is a 
risk, in the sense that a number of donors don’t want our overhead costs 
to be high. We don’t, we want get as much money we can to children. 
So, it’s a challenge that we have to deal with. We may get negative 
feedback from donors, and we may get negative publicity if we seem to 
have overheads that are too high. (#14-F-NE) 
Being perceived as an organization with high overheads can make donors less 
willing to fund SCN, as another respondent noted:  
Money basically should go to programs. There is a percentage of 
administration and that percentage should be as low as possible. If the 
donors see that we’re using 20 percent in administration, they will give 
the money to some else that only has 17 percent. They [donors] would 
like the money to go to beneficiaries. (#7-F-NOR) 
In constructing reputation as an object at risk, five respondents explained that a 
good public image is a valuable asset for SCN, because it helps the 
organization to obtain funding. As a respondent from head office summed up:  
Reputation is what we live on, for people to give money. We have a 
great reputation here. Obviously reputation is also another level of risk. 
(...) We cannot afford to make many mistakes. We have a great name, 
so we can afford to make small mistakes. (#6-F-NOR)  
According to another respondent from head office, reputation is matter of trust. 
A case of child abuse or corruption would cast doubt on whether the 
organization deserves to be trusted by donors and beneficiaries. She explained:  
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Risk is a matter of protecting your reputation, as well. (…) If you get a 
very bad case of child abuse or corruption that does crop up in the 
media from time to time, for example, you lose trust from donors, the 
public and children. That’s not possible, that should not be possible for 
Save the Children Norway, given the objectives that we have (...) A 
NGO with a mission like ours can only survive if we have the trust of 
the people that want to support us, and of the children we want to 
support. So, it goes both ends of the organization. We will not be able to 
assist children, if they don’t trust us to do that job well, at the end of the 
programming. The same applies to donors. Donors won’t give us money 
if they don’t trust us to do a good job or if something goes wrong. (#10-
F-NOR)   
While some respondents spoke of the utility of reputation, others emphasized 
its vulnerability. For instance, a respondent from head office recalled the old 
adage that it takes a lifetime to build a good reputation, but one minute to lose 
it. She said: “(...) the reputation that has been built over the years, being trusted 
by children that we work with in the programs and by the donors. The biggest 
risk is that you can lose it very quickly, very easily, with just one event” (#10-
F-NOR). The same respondent indicated that SCN loses reputation when what 
the organization says does not match what it actually does. She argued: 
If it was showed that children were being exploited in our programs, 
whether sexually or by other means; using children labor or something 
of that nature. In another words, if we’re not doing the job we’re saying 
we’re doing, then, that’s a risk. (#10-F-NOR) 
Another respondent added that even a bad decision could put SCN’s reputation 
at stake:  
I think every decision made by the senior management team should be 
seen in the light of: Will that attract any critical media? It is because we 
need to... I mean, our responsibility is to our donors and we really need 
to show them that any decision was well-founded, smart and good. We 
must avoid making bad decisions. (#6-F-NOR)  
Interestingly, some respondents indicated that preserving SCN’s reputation 
may come into conflict with protecting other objects deemed of value, which 
creates dilemmas for SCN. For instance, a respondent from head office 
explained that SCN could risk its reputation by asking permission to use 
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earmarked donations for a different disaster, even when an assessment of 
beneficiaries’ needs would justify spending the money elsewhere. If SCN 
follows its mandate and helps those who need the most, the organization might 
end up damaging its reputation:  
We fundraise for emergencies and most of the time we will fundraise 
really hard to reach an appeal target. (...). In some areas or 
circumstance, people just gave and gave and gave because they saw the 
picture live on TV. They saw it [the Japanese tsunami] just wrecking 
everything in its path (...). SC is spending the money, but not as quickly 
as it is coming in. There’s more money for Japan then, for instance, for 
the Horn of Africa, according to the people’s needs. Because in Japan 
the government is strong (...) they are taking care of their own citizens. 
SC is spending money (...), but the need is less in Japan than in the 
Horn of Africa. Here’s a risk assessment. How do you say to your 
donors that gave money for SC to use in Japan that we have given it a 
second thought and Japan now has enough money? How can we use the 
money that you gave us for Japan in the Horn of Africa without ruining 
our reputation? “Why did you ask us for that money for Japan if there 
was no need?” (...)  What’s the risk? The risk is reputation. Why people 
should give us money in the future, if we suddenly turn around and say 
“That was nice of you to give us all that money, but we really don’t 
want to spend it there.” (#6-F-NOR) 
Another respondent, from Nepal, spoke of the dilemma between maintaining 
low overheads to safeguard reputation, and running the organization:   
[T]o run good monitoring and evaluation, to design good projects, to 
provide good materials on communication, it requires money which is 
not directly given to children, but it’s used in a sense to operate the 
organization. So, how do you balance that? How much should be going 
to direct programs to children? How much should go to the 
organization? (#14-F-NE) 
5.3 Summary of findings 
Drawing on the relational theory of risk (Boholm and Corvellec 2011), I have 
deconstructed the organizational risks identified by SCN employees in their 
interviews with me. This has revealed an intricate web of risk objects, objects 
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at risk, and relationships of risk, as depicted in Figure 15. It should be noted 
that these objects emerged from my interpretation of respondents’ answers 
rather than an a priori classification. 
One noteworthy finding was that the “building blocks” beneath the plethora of 
organizational risks identified by SCN’s employees were remarkably similar. 
Regardless of their working location, area of function or hierarchical level, all 
respondents constructed relationships of risk around four main risk objects: 
staff, partners, the host government, and the host country; and five main 
objects at risk: staff, children, reputation, funds, and the results of projects and 
programs carried out by the organization. These represent what employees 
perceive as dangerous for SCN and what they consider valuable for the 
organization, respectively.  
Some objects were conceptualized both as risk object and an object at risk, 
often by the same respondent. For instance, several respondents saw staff as a 
source of danger to children, funds, and the results of projects; but also as 
vulnerable to the security situation in the host country or actions of the host 
governments against SCN. This finding corroborates with the view expressed 
by Boholm and Corvellec (2011): that the identity of risk objects and objects at 
risk is not fixed. In fact, as we have seen, even valuable objects like funds, 
programs, and staff may, under certain circumstances, be perceived as risky. 
Interestingly, among all the objects singled out by respondents, children and 
reputation were always depicted as valuable and worth protecting. Further, 
“results” was never constructed as a risk object; however, the implementation 
of programs and projects was described as a potential source of harm to 
children.  
Moreover, the construction of something as risky often involved accentuating 
certain characteristics of the object. For examples, host countries were deemed 
insecure, prone to natural disaster, corrupt, or politically instable; partners 
were described as uncontrollable, lacking capacity or commitment. All such 
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attributes were highlighted in order to justify their perceived riskiness. This 
finding is consistent with the relational theory of risk, which posits that 
labeling something as dangerous or risky “involves downplaying other traits of 
the object and considering them less significant” (Boholm and Corvellec 
2011:179).  
Figure 15: Relationships of risk – summary 
 
The construction of the host country, partners, and the host government as risk 
objects also reveals a curious paradox: even though these objects are “risky,” 
SCN actively seeks to engage with them. Although respondents stated that 
local NGOs and host governments could put results and funds in jeopardy, 
SCN believes that sustainable impact for children can only be achieved when 
these actors are involved. Additionally, despite the risks involved in operating 
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in “dangerous” countries, SCN wants to be there, and, as some respondents 
noted, receives funding to be precisely there. As one respondent from head 
office summed up: “Risk is part of the reality we deal with” (#15-F-NOR). 
And finally, we should note that some respondents directly connected SCN’s 
reputation to the “well-being” of other objects at risk, such as children, results 
and funds. If an employee were to be publically implicated in a case of child 
abuse or exploitation involving beneficiaries, for example, that would severely 
affect SCN’s credibility as children’s rights organization. Therefore, any risk 
to children would be a risk to SCN’s public standing. Respondents justified the 
importance of a good reputation mainly in terms of utility. Being perceived as 
a trustworthy organization allows SCN to secure access to funding.  
In the next chapter, I discuss what these results tell us about how employees 
form judgments about organizational risks. 
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6. RISK PERCEPTION AND THE PURSUIT OF 
LEGITIMACY 
In the previous chapter, I deconstructed the organizational risks identified by 
SCN staff. We saw that all respondents constructed relationships of risk 
around eight main objects: the results of programs and projects, children, 
funds, reputation, staff, the host country, the host government, and partners. In 
this chapter, I draw on new institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and the relational theory of risk (Boholm and 
Corvellec  2011) to provide a partial explanation for the second research 
question: How do employees form judgments about organizational risks?  
I begin by placing the results of this study in the context of the literature. Then 
I argue that perceptions of organizational risk among SCN staff derive, 
although not exclusively, from isomorphic pressures to conform to 
legitimating rules, conventions, rational myths, and paradigms widespread in 
the international aid system. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of some 
limitations of this hypothesis. 
6.1 Organizational risk perception: beyond practice 
and context 
Previous studies have identified two important determinants of risk perception 
in organizational settings: one’s position within the organization (Marek et al. 
1985, Rayner 1986, Hutter 2001, Mohammed 2007); and managerial practice 
(Corvellec 2010). In this section, I show that neither practice nor working 
context can explain why all my respondents constructed relationships of risk 
around the same objects. I will also discuss a key problem with both 
explanations: that they fail to connect employees’ perspectives on risk to the 
world outside the organization.  
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We begin by examining the results of this study in the light of Corvellec’s 
(2010) practice-immanent view of risk. Based on practice theory and the idea 
that risk assessments involve a valuation process, Corvellec offers a theoretical 
explanation for why employees perceive organizational risks as they do. The 
researcher argues that managerial practices determine what objects are 
regarded as valuable for the organization, and consequently influence how 
employees form judgments about organization risk. If we follow this line of 
thought, SCN’s employees construct funds, results, staff, children and 
reputation as objects at risk because SNC has developed an operational model 
in which these objects play an important role for the well-being of the 
organization. If SCN had a different structure or management practices, 
respondents would have considered other objects to be important and worth 
protecting, and would therefore have perceived different organizational risks.  
Imagine that SCN is an environmental NGO, such as the Greenpeace. Thus, 
SCN’s mission is now to “ensure the ability of the Earth to nurture life in all its 
diversity,”21 instead of “inspir[ing] breakthroughs in the way the world treats 
children, and achiev[ing] immediate and lasting change in their lives” (SCN 
2009:2). Consequently, even though employees may personally consider 
children to be valuable, protecting the Earth would be essential for the 
organization to achieve its mission, rather than safeguarding children. In 
addition, this “Green-SCN” would most likely have a different organizational 
structure and managerial practices. Let us assume that, like Greenpeace, 
“Green-SCN” sees using ships in advocacy work as an effective approach. In 
this case, an employee might conceive the risk that such ships could pollute the 
seas if cleaning chemicals are not properly disposed of. However, it is unlikely 
that an employee of the real SCN would imagine such risk. It is not only 
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 Greenpeace’s mission. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq_old/questions-about-
greenpeace-in/ 
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because the organization values children instead of oceans, but because SCN 
does not own any ships.   
Corvellec’s argument has three main limitations. Firstly, the analysis focuses 
on the object at risk, by emphasizing the role of value in a risk relationship. 
However, it fails to theorize the risk object properly. Although the practice-
immanent view of risk may help explain why SCN employees see certain 
objects as being at risk, it does not explain why they construct staff, the host 
country, the host government and partners as “risky.” If risk is a relationship 
(Boholm and Corvellec 2011), then both sides of the equation matter: 
understanding why one object is conceived as dangerous is as important as 
understanding why another is constructed as valuable. In fact, it could be 
argued that there is no risk unless something represents a source of danger. 
Without a potential source of harm, the objects at risk identified by SCN 
employees are valuable, but they are not at risk.   
Secondly, Corvellec does not examine what shapes managerial practice, 
although that is a relevant question to ask. If practice determines value, and 
value determines risk, then any factor that influences managerial practice will 
have an effect on risk perception. And thirdly, because the analysis does not 
take into account the operating context of Skånetrafiken, the organization 
appears to exist in a social vacuum. In reality, “no organization is an island 
unto itself” (Smith 1999:241). For instance, is it possible to imagine an 
organization operating under a capitalist regime that does not consider its 
financial resources important and worth protecting, regardless of its field or 
operational model? Here it should be noted that Corvellec does not claim that 
practice is the one and only determinant of risk perception. Moreover, given 
the length of his article, the author may simply have run out of space to discuss 
factors that affect managerial practice.  
If we turn now to the literature on organizational risk perception in NGOs, I 
have, as mentioned in Chapter 2, found only one study that investigates 
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perceptions of organizational risk among NGO workers
22
 (Mohammed 2007, 
2010). Based on a case study of MASH Trust, a healthcare NGO from New 
Zealand, Mohammed found evidence that perceptions of organizational risk 
are contingent upon employees’ immediate working context, especially 
hierarchy and functional area. These findings are consistent with research on 
occupational health and safety, where studies have demonstrated the existence 
of different perspectives on risk and safety within a single organization, and 
that these perceptions are patterned according to one’s location within the 
organization (Marek et al. 1985, Rayner 1986, Cox and Flin 1998, Pidgeon 
1998, Hutter 2001).   
However, as we have seen, employees from a range of different working 
locations, areas of functions and hierarchical levels at SCN constructed 
relationships of risk around the same objects. Of course, one might argue that 
ultimately all respondents share the same “working context,” as they work for 
the same organization. But this cannot explain the similarities in risks 
described by employees of SCN and MASH Trust. Although the two 
organizations have distinct missions and organizational structures—SCN is a 
children’s rights organization with country offices in developing countries; 
MASH Trust is healthcare organization that provides services to people with 
disabilities through care houses in New Zealand—their employees identified 
similar risks, including loss of reputation, staff causing harm to beneficiaries, 
staff being harmed on the job, failure to secure sources of funding, as well as 
changes in governmental legislation and, political changes.   
Although Mohammed produced important evidence of the context-specific 
nature of organizational risk perception in NGOs, his study failed to take into 
consideration the fact that organizational settings are neither self-evident nor 
                                              
22
 There are, however,  several publications on risk management in the aid industry (see Wilson-Grau 
2003, Herman et al. 2004, Bertrand and Brown 2006, Grace 2010, Ward and Purdy 2010, Trivunovic 
et al. 2011)  
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independent of external influences. Focusing mainly on situational 
determinants of organization risk perception, he treated MASH Trust as if the 
organization “exist[s] in, but [is] ontologically separate from [its] 
environment” (Jerrard et al. 2008:22). Put differently, his study failed to 
problematize the context within which organizational perceptions of risk are 
investigated. 
Given the limitations identified above, I will argue that, in order to understand 
the perception of organizational risk among SCN staff, we need to put isolated 
risk issues into the context of a larger system, the aid industry (after Douglas 
1992:50).  
6.1.1 Putting risk into a larger context 
“NGOs do not exist in a vacuum” (Xiaoguang and Li 2006). They are not 
closed systems and cannot be viewed in isolation from what goes on around 
them (Fowler 1997 cited in Lewis 2001). Development and humanitarian 
NGOs such as SCN are deeply embedded in their own organizational field, the 
international aid system or aid industry (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). More 
than a cluster of interdependent organizations, the aid industry is a “socially 
constructed world” (Lister 2003:178). In this world, SCN shares a common 
meaning system with other actors united around development and 
humanitarian goals.
23
 
As an organizational field, the aid industry exerts influence over NGOs 
(Campion 2002, Rauh 2010), driving them to adopt similar structures, 
strategies and practices—a process known as isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983, Deephouse 1996). I have found some signs of isomorphism in 
SCN. First, like many donors and NGOs in the USA and Europe (Rauh 2010), 
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 For example, Northern, Southern, and international NGOs; multilateral and national development 
agencies; private and public donors; government agencies in developing countries; beneficiaries; and 
research institutions. 
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the organization uses the Logframe as a planning tool. Second, like most of the 
aid industry, SCN has gradually moved away from self-implementation of 
programs, towards working through local partners (Kruse et al. 2009). Third, 
SCN is in tune with the dominant discourse on aid effectiveness. To document 
added value and results, SCN follows complex routines of planning, reporting, 
monitoring, and evaluation. The very organizational context that influences 
staff perceptions of risks for SCN is itself a construction, often shaped by 
forces outside the organization. 
Why would SCN seek to conform to ideas and practices concerning 
development and NGOs that are widespread in the aid industry? New 
institutional theorists see the pursuit of legitimacy as the primary rationale for 
isomorphism (Scott 1995). “Legitimacy” in this context can be described as a 
social evaluation process by which organizations gain the support and social 
approval of other organizations in their field (Deephouse and Suchman 2008). 
Scott (1995) distinguishes three dimensions of legitimacy: normative, based on 
moral obligations; cognitive, based on mental models, conventions, and 
rational myths; and regulatory, based on formal and informal rules and norms. 
To gain endorsement from relevant stakeholders in their fields (Deephouse 
1996), organizations seek to conform to the dominant system of values, mental 
models, conventions, rules, and norms (Meyer and Rowan 1977): they do their 
utmost to follow the “rules of the game.”  
According to Hilhorst (2007:297), “much of what NGO actors do is inspired 
by everyday politics of organizational legitimation.” Legitimacy is a key 
driving force of organizational behavior because it enables NGOs to compete 
for scarce donor funds (Atack 1999, Nee 2003, Ossewaarde et al. 2008). 
NGOs have a greater need for legitimacy precisely because, in order to carry 
out their activities, they depend on the active and long-term engagement of 
external stakeholders (DiMaggio 1988 cited in Suchman 1995).  This is also 
the case with SCN, which relies on grants and donations as its primary source 
 111 
of income. Although SCN’s employees did not use the word “legitimacy,” 
several respondents spoke of the organization’s reputation as a value at stake. 
In fact, some respondents explicitly acknowledged that SCN’s survival 
depends upon it being perceived as a credible and trustworthy organization by 
donors, beneficiaries, and the general public. As a respondent from head office 
summed up: “Reputation is what we live on, for people to give money” (#6-F-
NOR). Several authors have suggested that the concepts of reputation and 
legitimacy are closely related (Deephouse and Carter 2005). Both concepts 
refer to stakeholders’ perceptions about an organization (Ashforth and Gibbs 
1990, Fombrun and Shanley1990) that, if positive, can improve its access to 
external resources (Hall 1992, Suchman 1995). If, then, we understand 
legitimacy and reputation as similar concepts, when my respondents 
constructed reputation as an object at risk, they were in fact acknowledging the 
importance of legitimacy for an organization like SCN. 
If the pursuit of legitimacy is a driving force of organizational behavior and 
structure (Scott 1995), does it affect perceptions of organizational risk? And if 
so, how do institutional pressures to conform to legitimating rules, 
conventions, rational myths, and paradigms widespread in the international aid 
system affect perceptions of organization risk among SCN staff? To these 
questions we now turn.  
6.2 Institutional determinants of risk perception 
Data collected at SCN indicate that institutional pressures to conform to the 
aid industry, driven by legitimacy considerations, play a role in shaping staff 
perceptions of organizational risk. This occurs in two ways. Firstly, 
expectations and rationalized myths (Meyer and Rowan 1977) about 
development and NGOs that are dominant in the aid industry set the criteria for 
legitimate organizational behavior, which influences perceptions of what is 
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important for SCN’s success and survival as an organization. Since there can 
be no risk unless “something of human value (including humans themselves) 
has been put at stake” (Rosa 1998:28), these conceptions of value serve as a 
background against which relationships of risk are constructed (Corvellec 
2010, Boholm and Corvellec 2011). Secondly, SCN faces conflicting 
legitimating criteria (Suchman 1995, Scott 1995) and multiple legitimating 
audiences
24
 (Lister 2003).The inherent tensions between different types and 
sources of legitimacy give rise to perceptions of organizational risks, as actions 
to meet one legitimacy criterion may jeopardize another (Ossewaarde et al. 
2008).  
6.2.1 Legitimacy, value and objects at risk  
As mentioned in the Chapter 2, researchers have identified five key criteria for 
NGO legitimacy which reflect socially constructed ideas about development 
and NGO organizational behavior (Meyer and Rowan 1977). These are: (1) the 
moral character of an NGO’s mission, including  level of correlation between 
professed values and practices (Saxby 1996, Edwards 1999, Atack 1999, 
Edwards and Zadek 2003, Vidal et al. 2006, Ossewaarde et al. 2008); (2) legal 
compliance (Edwards 1999, Edwards and Zadek 2003, Lister 2003, 
Ossewaarde et al. 2008);  (3) accountability and good governance (Edwards 
and Hulme 1995, Saxby 1996, Atack 1999, Lister 2003, Vidal et al. 2006, 
Ossewaarde et al. 2008); (4) performance, efficiency, and technical expertise 
(Saxby 1996, Eade 1997, Fowler 1997, Pearce 1997, Atack 1999, Brown 2001, 
Edwards and Zadek 2003, Lister 2003, Vidal et al. 2006, Ossewaarde et al. 
2008); and (5) experience in the South and partnership with Southern NGOs 
(Lister 2001, Lister 2003, Brehm 2001 cited in Rauh 2010).  
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Compliance with criteria upon which SCN’s legitimacy rests influences 
employee understandings of what is valuable for the organization and should 
be protected. That helps explain, although not exclusively, the construction of 
certain objects as a value at stake. As I seek to show, the risk-construction of 
funds, children, and the results of programs and projects implemented by SCN 
was directly related to sources of NGO legitimacy reported in the literature. 
The construction of children as an object of risk can be linked to the moral 
character of SCN’s mission, which is a powerful source of legitimacy to the 
organization. Who would not agree that working for children’s rights is both 
desirable and necessary? Therefore, being perceived as an organization that 
acts in the best interests of children endows SCN with an aura of “moral 
authority” for saying what it says and doing what it does (Edwards 1995 cited 
in Kuroda and Imata 2003:1–2). Moreover, it allows SCN to secure resources 
that are essential for its survival (Atack 1999, Nee 2003, Ossewaarde et al. 
2008). 
However, the moral character of SCN’s mission requires the organization to 
live up to its self-proclaimed values and standards. If, directly or indirectly, the 
organization exposes children to harm, that would cast doubt upon SCN’s 
moral authority. As a respondent from head office observed: “You went to 
SCN’s event and you drowned. How’s that for saving children’s lives? So, it’s 
on our name” (#6-F-NOR). A case of abuse could jeopardize SCN’s entire 
support system. Who would donate funds or listen to an organization that 
violates its own, morally charged, mandate? Although respondents stressed the 
intrinsic importance of children in their examples of risk—after all, they do 
believe that children are worth protecting—they were also concerned about the 
effect that a case of child abuse or exploitation would have on SCN’s 
reputation. As another respondent from Oslo argued:  
If we expose children to risks ourselves, just imagine what would be the 
consequences for the individual child, the consequences for SC as a 
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credible organization. I think that the risk on our own conduct is very 
high. If we experience cases of abuse or anything it would be just 
devastating to the child and to the organization. (#3-M-NOR)  
“Children” becomes the background against which risk relationships are 
constructed because SCN achieves normative legitimacy precisely by “saving 
the children.”  
The construction of results as an object at risk stems from institutional 
pressures for performance and efficiency. The idea that development is all 
about results has now become a “dominant cognitive model” (Scott 1994 cited 
in Lister 2003) in the aid industry, as a response to charge that aid does not 
work (Leroy 2012). And this means not just any result, but measurable and 
quantitative outcomes, preferably obtained in the short or middle term. In order 
to achieve cognitive legitimacy, SCN must operate under the same frame of 
reference as its donors and other NGOs (Scott 2001). This requires not only 
embracing the results rhetoric and adopting a results-based management 
approach, but also delivering on results promised to donors in exchange for 
funding. As some respondents noted, SCN’s main donor, Norad, is particularly 
insistent about documentation of results achieved.  
Demonstrating performance is also a way of gaining normative legitimacy, as 
it shows that the organization is competent and truly committed to its mission. 
In order to justify its existence, SCN must show how its programs and projects 
contribute to improve children’s lives. As a respondent from Bosnia-
Herzegovina noted: “We are here as an organization to add value to the chain, 
to the processes. So, that we can justify why we are here and we can improve 
the situation for children” (#4-F-SEE). Thus, SCN states in its Strategy 2010–
2013 (2009:8): “We will strengthen our [brand and] position [in Norway] by 
communicating the results we achieve for children rather than only describing 
their needs. We want to demonstrate that development cooperation works.” 
That means that if programs implemented by SCN suffer adverse effects 
(delays, interruptions, reduction in scope, etc.), the organization can be seen as 
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failing to meet expectations of donors and the general public, and damage will 
be done to its credibility as development actor. Hence, the construction of 
results as an object at risk.  
The construction of funds as a value at stake also relates to sources of NGO 
legitimacy identified in the literature: the moral character of SCN’s mission; 
and accountability and good governance. As a claim-label (Hilhorst 2003:7), 
the term “NGO” implies that the organization’s actions are motivated by the 
common good rather than private interests. As a result, NGOs are expected to 
be good stewards of the financial resources entrusted by donors, and be 
accountable for how these resources are spent. If funds are lost due to 
corruption or fraud, especially involving employees, SCN’s “moral aura” 
would be tarnished. Who would donate money to an organization that has been 
involved in a serious corruption scandal? As one respondent from head office 
observed: 
If you get a very bad case of child abuse or corruption (…), for 
example, you lose trust from donors, the public and children. (…) A 
NGO with a mission like ours can only survive if we have the trust of 
the people that want to support us, and of the children we want to 
support. (…) Donors won’t give us money if they don’t trust us to do a 
good job or if something goes wrong. (#10-F-NOR)   
Ideas about appropriated standards of NGO accountability and good 
governance gain legal mandate when they are enforced through coercion. An 
example is the zero-tolerance policy on corruption in development cooperation 
adopted by the Norwegian government. Serving as a risk management strategy 
for Norad and the MFA, the policy requires grant recipients to repay funds in 
case of financial irregularities. Therefore, protecting funds allows SCN to 
preserve its reputation and also avoid loses. As a respondent summed up: “It is 
costly for us to not follow the zero-tolerance policy” (#22-M-NO). 
As seen through the lenses of the relational theory of risk, there is nothing 
inherently valuable about children, results or funds. They have been 
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constructed as such—and are consequently subject to debate and 
reinterpretation (Corvellec 2010, Boholm and Corvellec 2011). The question 
is: “who does the constructing?” (Clarke and Short 1993:380). Here I hold that 
institutional pressures within the aid industry can affect perceptions of 
organizational risk, by shaping what respondents perceive as valuable to obtain 
and maintain SCN’s legitimacy as a development actor. These conceptions of 
value serve as reference point against which respondents establish 
relationships of risk.  When risks do strike, SCN may fail to meet expectations 
and conventions about NGOs and development, upon which their reputation 
and credibility rest.  
As Scott (1995) reminds us, legitimacy is socially constructed. In other words, 
the “sources” of NGO legitimacy reflect shared understandings about how 
NGOs should operate, and about how to “do” development—understandings 
that have, over time, become accepted in the aid industry as appropriate 
courses of action. Other criteria for NGO legitimacy would have given rise to 
other risks, because that would imply a different way of evaluating what it is 
important for the organization’s survival and success (after Corvellec 2010). A 
social-constructionist view of risk and organizations “encourages 
counterfactual thinking; that is, paying attention to what could have happened, 
but did not” (Clarke and Short 1993:382).   
It should be noted, however, that in my study of SCN I did not find a strong 
connection between the construction of staff as an object at risk and sources of 
NGO legitimacy identified in the literature. I return to this point in section 6.3, 
in connection with the limitations involved in linking risk perception to the 
pursuit of legitimacy.  
Legitimacy and risk objects? 
If institutional pressures for conformity driven by legitimacy considerations 
play a role in the construction of certain objects as “at risk,” what accounts for 
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the construction of other objects as being risky? That is a relevant question if 
risk is understood as a relationship. In this respect, however, the relational 
theory of risk (Boholm and Corvellec 2011) does not provide an answer. 
Following Rescher (1983) and Rosa (1998), the theory posits that when people 
say that there is a risk that A could affect B, they do so because B is 
considered valuable. Nevertheless, if risk objects are not inherently dangerous, 
we need to know what it is about A that makes people perceive it as a potential 
source of harm. Here I will draw on the psychometric paradigm to suggest that 
at least the construction of partners as a risk object can also be understood in 
the context of the pursuit of legitimacy. Data collected at SCN indicate that 
local partners are perceived as risky because, although SCN obtains legitimacy 
by working with them, the organization does not have control over their 
actions.  
During the early stages of data analysis, it struck me that several respondents 
portrayed partners as a source of potential danger, even though collaboration 
with NGOs and host governments in the South is a key working principle for 
SCN. In fact, the entire aid industry today is convinced that partnership and 
developing local capacity are essential to bring about development, although 
self-implementation was the standard procedure for most Northern NGOs until 
the 1980s, including SCN. As a “dominant cognitive model” (Scott 1994 cited 
in Lister 2003), the partnership discourse manifests itself in regulatory 
constraints. For instance, most donors today would not finance projects 
proposed by Northern NGOs that are not implemented through local partners 
in the South. In addition, some developing countries have adopted laws that 
prohibit INGOs from implementing projects directly. Consequently, working 
through Southern partners allows a Northern-based NGO like SCN to obtain 
and maintain both cognitive and regulatory legitimacy (Brehm 2001 cited in 
Rauh 2010, Lister 2001, Lister 2003).  Yet, several of my respondents said that 
partnership with local NGOs or the host government can be risky, especially as 
regards funds and the results of projects and programs.  
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According to Boholm and Corvellec (2011:180), “[r]isk management and 
governance strive to keep the risk object out and the object at risk in by 
developing an adequate risk management regime.” However, the opposite 
happens at SCN. The organization must keep the risk object in, since 
partnership with Southern NGOs and governmental agencies is a source of its 
own legitimacy. My data indicate that the construction of partners as a risk 
object seems to derive from a perceived loss of managerial control. During the 
interviews, some respondents spoke of control when describing partners as a 
risk object. For instance, a respondent from Uganda argued: 
A risk... I would say…it is the partnership mode. It’s very nice but it 
also has its challenges. I would say that 90 percent of what we do is 
through partners, and yet we don’t really have that much control over 
what the partners do. (#18-M-UG)  
Several studies on public risk perception using the psychometric approach 
have shown that perceptions of control (or lack thereof) influence how people 
form judgments about risk. Researchers have found that people tend to 
consider hazardous activities or technologies riskier when they feel they do not 
have control over them (Fischoff et al. 1978, Rachman 1990 cited in Oltedal et 
al. 2004). 
In addition, de Graaf (1987 cited in Lewis 2001:141-142) suggests that the 
environment in which NGOs operate consists of some factors/processes that 
fall within their control, and others over which these organization have limited 
or no influence (see Figure 16). Note that governmental agencies and other 
NGOs occupy the second concentric circle of Graf’s framework: this circle 
includes elements of an NGO environment that can be influenced through 
persuasion, lobbying, patronage, co-option and collaboration, but not 
controlled.  
Under the partnership mode, SCN “outsources” to its partners the 
implementation of programs and the disbursement of funds, but retains liability 
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Source: de Graaf 1987 cited in  (Lewis 
2001:141-142).  
 
in case something goes wrong. 
For instance, in case of 
corruption involving 
partners, SCN will have to 
repay the grant money to the 
Norwegian government. 
Moreover, if partners fail to 
deliver expected results, so 
does SCN. As noted earlier, 
results and funds are 
perceived as valuable 
because they are directly 
linked to accountability and 
performance, which are 
important sources of NGO 
legitimacy: hence the 
emphasis on mechanisms to 
assess the potential risks that 
partners can bring to SCN. 
I did not find enough support on my data to claim that the construction of other 
objects as risky, like staff, the host country and the host government, was also 
related to sources of NGO legitimacy. I return to this point in section 6.3. 
6.2.2 The dilemmas of NGO legitimacy 
The Oxford dictionary (2012) defines “dilemma” as a situation in which a 
choice must be made between two equally unfavorable options. During the 
interviews, some respondents spoke of dilemmas faced by SCN when 
describing risks for the organization. These dilemmas reflect conflicting 
expectations about NGO behavior to which SCN must conform in order to be 
Figure 16: Span of an NGO’s control 
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perceived as a legitimate actor in the aid industry. As I will seek to 
demonstrate, the tensions between different types and “sources” of legitimacy 
and different stakeholder priorities over legitimacy sources (Suchman 1995, 
Scott 2001) play a role in shaping employees’ perceptions of organizational 
risk, since actions to secure one source of NGO legitimacy may put another at 
risk (Ossewaarde et al. 2008).   
One of the dilemmas singled out by respondents concerns conflicting 
expectations as to professionalism and low administrative costs. Like other 
development NGOs, SCN is expected to act as a “channel,” transferring funds 
from donors in the North to beneficiaries in the South, with minimum 
expenditure for administration. On the other hand, SCN is also expected to 
behave as a professional organization with good management systems to 
ensure that funds are well spent and results achieved. This requires using part 
of the funds raised to run the organization itself (paying salaries, maintaining 
properties, fund-raising, paying software licenses, etc.). As a respondent from 
Nepal explained:  
We may say that our overhead costs are getting too high. Ok, that is a 
risk, in the sense that a number of donors don’t want our overhead costs 
to be high. We don’t, we want get as much money we can to children. 
So, it’s a challenge that we have to deal with. We may get negative 
feedback from donors, and we may get negative publicity if we seem to 
have overheads that are too high. Having said that, to run good 
monitoring and evaluation, to design good projects, to provide good 
materials on communication, it requires money which is not directly 
given to children, but it’s used in a sense to operate the organization. 
So, how do you balance that? How much should be going to direct 
programs to children? How much should go to the organization? (#14-
F-NE) 
In one way or another, the organization will face risks, hence the dilemma. If 
SCN keeps administrative costs low at the expenses of improving controls and 
monitoring systems, the organization risks corruption or failing to deliver 
expected results. If SCN invests to improve its internal control mechanisms at 
the expense of keeping administrative costs low, the organization risks being 
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criticized for not channeling the majority of donations to beneficiaries. As 
noted earlier, failing to deliver program outcomes, corruption, and high 
overheads are all risks for SCN. The “rules of the game” in the aid industry 
can create risks for SCN, by forcing it to prioritize one source of NGO 
legitimacy over another.   
SCN faces not only multiple legitimating criteria, but multiple stakeholders 
whose interests and views may conflict with each other (Lister 2003). Seeking 
legitimacy with one stakeholder group may jeopardize the organization’s 
reputation and credibility with another (Lim 2012). This conflict was noted by 
some respondents who reflected upon the dilemma between speaking out 
against violations of children’s rights in the host country and keeping silent 
about sensitive/politicized issues. As an organization that claims to fight for 
the promotion, protection, and fulfillment of children’s rights, SCN is 
expected—by beneficiaries, other NGOs and the general public in Norway—to 
act according to its mission. This entails speaking up for children whenever the 
occasion arises, as a respondent from head office noted: 
(…) we do have a huge responsibility because Save the Children is a 
huge organization, which is also seen by other organizations as a big 
organization, one that should step up on behalf of children and be the 
voice of children (#6-F-NOR) 
However, these are not the only relevant social actors for SCN. An important 
legitimating stakeholder is the host government, which has regulatory authority 
over the organization’s operations within that country. From the perspective of 
the host government, a “legitimate” NGO is one whose actions match its 
values and expectations (Deephouse 1996). In certain countries, this means 
that SCN is allowed to do service delivery, but prohibited from doing 
advocacy work. Working in these countries involves a difficult choice, as a 
respondent from head office explained: “You work there under this frame and 
you keep a low profile when it comes to political issues; or you choose to not 
work in the country and raise your voice.” (#15-F-NOR)  
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Here lies the dilemma. If SCN speaks out against the abuse of children’s rights 
in these countries, the organization loses legitimacy with the government. This 
could put the safety of staff and the implementation of programs at risk.  
However, if SCN remain quiet about violations, in order to help their target 
group on the ground, the organization risks being accused by other 
stakeholders of violating its mandate. As another respondent noted:  
That’s the dilemma. SC media and communication people will always 
be saying: “We can’t be somewhere and not talk about it. We cannot be 
in the Horn of Africa and see that Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières 
and others are speaking broadly and boldly about violations against 
children and we are in the same place and we are not allowed to do so.” 
(#6-F-NOR) 
Regardless of which stakeholder SCN chooses to prioritize, the organization 
will encounter risks. In fact, an advocacy manual produced by representatives 
from six SC national organizations (including SCN) states:  
(…) sometimes it is necessary to take a strong stand on an issue and this 
may involve some risk. It is always hard to decide whether it is more 
important to speak out strongly and risk being jailed or kicked out of the 
country, or to stay silent and risk losing legitimacy by not standing up 
for your members and constituents. (International Save the Children 
Alliance 2007:60) 
6.3 Limitations  
There is no simple explanation for how people form judgments about risk. On 
the contrary, researchers have identified a wide range of factors that influence 
risk perception. These include heuristics and probability judgment biases; 
characteristics of the risk; religious and quasi-religious beliefs; trust; feelings; 
personality traits; cultural dispositions and worldviews; personal experience; 
socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender and race; mass media 
coverage; and information retrieval (Urban and Ščasný 2007). Therefore, it is 
important to acknowledge three main limitations of arguing that institutional 
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pressures influence employees’ perceptions of organizational risk: it lacks 
organizational agency; it does not apply to all objects at risk and risk objects 
singled out by SCN employees; it rests upon a social-constructionist view of 
risk and organizations. 
Critics have argued that the new institutionalism downplays organizational 
resistance, agency, and self-interest (DiMaggio 1988,Oliver 1991, Fligstein 
2001). Consequently, the idea that institutional pressures influence perceptions 
of organizational risk can be accused of portraying organizations as passive 
recipients of external influences. A clarification is required here. Although I 
suggest that perceptions of organizational risk among SCN’s employees are 
influenced by isomorphic pressures in the aid industry, that does not mean that 
SCN itself lacks the capacity to act and influence outcomes. Quite the 
opposite: “[k]nowledge about risk serves action” (Boholm and Corvellec 
2011:181). Individuals and organizations decide how to respond to the risks 
they perceive. For instance, SCN has been working to improve its financial 
systems to reduce the risk of fraud and corruption. At the same time, the 
organization and other Norwegian NGOs have been lobbying the Norwegian 
government to change the zero-tolerance policy. Thus, SCN has been actively 
resisting a policy that leaves all financial risks in doing development work to 
the grant recipient. 
Another shortcoming of this study is that I was not able to demonstrate that all 
objects singled out by respondents were related to sources of NGO legitimacy. 
I myself saw the construction of staff as an object at risk as being related to the 
moral character of SCN’s mission and legal compliance to employment 
regulations, but there was not enough support in my data for making such 
claim. In fact, none of my respondents described a risk for staff as a risk for 
SCN’s reputation. I encountered a similar problem with the risk objects. It 
could be argued that the host country and the host government were perceived 
as risky because SCN has no control over them (de Graaf 1987 cited in Lewis 
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2001:141–142), even though the organization gains legitimacy by operating in 
and having links with the South (Lister 2001, Lister 2003, Brehm 2001 cited in 
Rauh 2010).However, I found little evidence in the data to support that claim. 
As explained in Chapter 4, I did not develop my interview questions on the 
basis of the relational theory of risk, and so I did not probe respondents on, for 
instance, why it was important to protect staff, or why the host country was 
dangerous.  
The third limitation of linking institutional pressures to risk perception is that 
it is based on a social constructionist view of risk and organizations. As noted 
in Chapter 2, there is ongoing debate about the ontological status of risk (Renn 
1998, Breakwell 2007, Aven 2011). Briefly put: is risk something “out there,” 
or is it something that “lies in the eye of the beholder”? Space constraints 
prevent me from delving more deeply into this debate. It should be noted, 
however, that a different ontological and epistemological view of risk would 
have implied an entire different approach to tackling the research questions of 
this study. For instance, the view of risk as a product of individual intra-
psychic processes would have required psychological rating scales and 
statistical methods for studying perceptions of organizational risk among SCN 
staff.  
Finally, it must be stressed that institutional pressures are not the only 
determinants of organizational risk perception. Situational factors like working 
location, hierarchy level, and functional-area membership do play a role in 
shaping employees’ perceptions of risk for themselves and their organization 
(Marek et al. 1985, Rayner 1986, Hutter 2001, Mohammed 2007, 2010). 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis set out to investigate how NGO workers form judgments about 
organizational risks, on the basis of a case study of Save the Children Norway 
(SCN), an international children’s rights organization that provides both 
humanitarian and development aid. In contrast to a previous study on risk 
perception in NGOs that focused on employees’ position within the 
organization (Mohammed 2007, 2010), this thesis adopted SCN itself as 
primary unit of analysis. The intention was to examine the influence of 
organization–environment relations on employees’ perceptions of 
organizational risk.   
I begin this concluding chapter by summarizing the main findings of this 
thesis. Next, I discuss some implications for the relational theory of risk 
(Boholm and Corvellec 2011). Finally, I suggest some directions for further 
research. 
7.1 The thesis in a nutshell 
Armed with the relational theory of risk, I decomposed the risk issues 
identified by SCN’s employees into their component parts (Chapter 5). This 
revealed that the building blocks in many risk issues were surprisingly similar. 
All respondents constructed relationship of risk involving four risk objects 
(staff, the host country, the host government, and partners) and five objects at 
risk (results of projects and programs, children, funds, reputation, and staff)—
regardless of their working location, area of function or hierarchical level. In 
addition, I showed that the identity of these objects as “dangerous” or 
“valuable” was not fixed: even valuable objects such as staff and funds could 
under certain circumstances be conceived as a potential source of harm.   
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From these findings, I argued that current explanations for organizational risk 
perception that focus on managerial practice  (Corvellec 2010), and 
employees’ position within the organization (Mohammed 2007, 2010) lack 
explanatory power when risk issues are deconstructed. Both those approaches 
also have important shortcomings. Corvellec’s practice-immanent view of risk 
(2010) does not address what shapes managerial practice, and to some extent 
takes risk objects for granted. Mohammed (2007, 2010) treats organizational 
settings as self-evident and unproblematic, failing to problematize the context 
in which perceptions of risk are investigated.  
In addition, both explanations lose sight of the fact  that “no organization is an 
island unto itself” (Smith 1999:241). An organization such as SCN depends on 
external stakeholders in various ways: it relies on public and private donors to 
obtain financial resources; it needs the approval of the host government in 
developing countries to operate within their borders; it depends on partners to 
implement projects and programs on the ground; and so on. All organizations 
are embedded in larger societal systems which affect their structure and 
behavior (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Much of what organizations do is 
driven by the pursuit of external endorsement, which allows them to gain 
access to essential resources (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Suchman 1995, 
Deephouse and Suchman 2008). 
Drawing on new institutional theory, I have suggested that to understand 
respondents’ perceptions of organizational risk, we need to put risk issues into 
the context of SCN’s operating environment: the aid industry. The pursuit of 
legitimacy should be recognized not only as a driving force of organizational 
structure and behavior, but also as playing a role in shaping understandings of 
organizational risk.  To support this argument, I showed that the construction 
of certain objects as dangerous and others as valuable was related to sources of 
NGO legitimacy. In SCN, children, funds, and results were constructed as 
valuable—and consequently potentially at risk (Corvellec 2010, Boholm and 
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Corvellec 2011) — because they are necessary for SCN to meet prevailing 
expectations and institutionalized myths about NGOs and development in the 
aid industry. For instance, by safeguarding children from any harm related to 
the conduct of employees or the organization’s operations, SCN preserves its 
image as an organization that acts in the best interests of children. 
Additionally, the construction of SCN’s reputation itself as an object at risk 
demonstrates the importance of external endorsement for the organization’s 
survival and success. I also showed that legitimacy considerations, coupled 
with perceptions of lack of managerial control, may account for the 
construction of some objects as risky. For example, to conform to the 
dominant idea that aid can work only when Southern partners are involved and 
local capacity is developed, SCN must allow its partners control over funds 
and project results, both essential to SCN’s reputation: hence the construction 
of partners as a potential source of danger.  
Seeking legitimation as an development and humanitarian NGO is no easy task 
(Hilhorst 2007). SCN faces not only conflicting legitimacy criteria, but 
multiple legitimating audiences, whose views and priorities may clash. Actions 
to meet one legitimacy criterion may jeopardize another criterion (Ossewaarde 
et al. 2008). If SCN gives preference to one stakeholder, that may damage the 
organization’s relationship with another. Trapped in dilemmas, the 
organization sees risk everywhere. For instance, should SCN improve its 
management system thereby risking high overheads? Or should it prioritize 
keeping administrative costs low, and thereby risk losing funds due to 
corruption? In one way or another, the organization risks failing to meet 
important criteria upon which its legitimacy rests. Unable to change the rules 
of the game, SCN resorts to risk management as a way out of the “double 
bind”. As a respondent summed up: “Controlling the risks, if you like, it’s 
constant” (#15-F-NOR). 
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That said, institutional pressures driven by legitimacy considerations are not 
the sole determinant of perceptions of organizational risk. Studies of 
occupational health and safety have produced ample evidence that where one 
sits within the organization determines what one sees as a risk (see Hutter 
2001, Rayner 1986, Marek et al. 1985). The main contribution of the present 
study is to show the importance of taking into consideration an organization’s 
external environment when investigating why employees perceive 
organizational risks as they do.  
7.2 Comments on the relational theory of risk 
Working with a relatively unknown theory may seem a risky move for an 
academic thesis. Yet, I believe this can enable novice researchers to engage in 
theory building. Here I briefly outline some reflections on Boholm and 
Corvellec’s (2011) relational theory of risk. 
Although researchers increasingly acknowledge the role of context, social 
practices, cultural representations in risk perception, “there is little 
understanding of how these social factors interact with the range of risk 
characteristics
25
 identified by the psychometric tradition” (Williamson and 
Weyman 2005:iv).  I believe the relational theory of risk can provide a way of 
connecting psychological and socio-cultural approaches to risk. 
There is something very appealing about the psychometric paradigm (Fischoff 
et al. 1978), despite all the criticisms.
26
 It seems reasonable to argue that 
people find activities and technologies less risky when they are in charge of 
them, or when the negative effects take a long time to become visible. In fact, 
as I showed in Chapter 6 the construction of partners as a risk objects relates to 
                                              
25
 Controllable or incontrollable; voluntary or involuntary; effect delayed or immediate; etc. 
26
 See Sjöberg et al. (2004) for a complete review. 
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a perception of lack of managerial control. The real question is not whether 
psychologists are wrong or right, but what exactly it is that psychometric 
studies measure. Drawing on the relational theory of risk, I hold that the risk 
characteristics described by psychologists should be seen not as objective 
properties of risk, but as attributes that the observer chooses to highlight when 
constructing an object as risky.   
For example, the asymmetry in partnership relations between Northern and 
Southern NGOs is often emphasized in the literature on NGOs and 
development studies (see Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 
Oaxaca 2006).  This imbalance stems from the fact that Northern NGOs often 
assume a donor role in the aid chain, channeling funds raised in the North to a 
few selected NGOs in the South. Although “he who pays the piper calls the 
tune,” some of my respondents felt that they could not control SCN’s local 
partners, especially as regards project implementation. Southern NGOs do find 
ways of exercising their agency in relations with their Northern counterparts 
and funding agencies  (Wallace et al. 2006, Rauh 2010). For instance, Wallace 
et al. (2006) report that Southern NGOs put aside paper-based plans and 
indicators in their daily work, but revert to these tools when reporting to 
donors. Therefore, being controllable or incontrollable is not an objective 
characteristic of partners, but an aspect that may be highlighted or 
downplayed. And what is control, if not a perception?  
Emphasizing the role of value in a relationship of risk, the relational theory of 
risk places considerable emphasis on the object at risk, but to some extent 
neglects the risk object. The psychometric paradigm does precisely the 
opposite: focusing on the risk object, it seeks to discover the characteristics 
attributed to an activity and technology that account for its perceived riskiness. 
Combining both approaches should serve to advance our understanding of how 
relationships of risk are constructed. 
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7.3 Recommendations for further studies 
The main contribution of this admittedly exploratory study is to identify foci, 
models, theories, or instruments that could be used in subsequent studies (Yin 
2003a,b). In this section I propose some future research directions, in terms of 
methods and research questions. 
To begin with, further work needs to be done to test the basic hypothesis that 
institutional pressures driven by the pursuit of organizational legitimacy play a 
role in shaping employees’ perceptions of organizational risk. Drawing on the 
experience of this study, I recommend researchers to pay special attention to 
issue of research access, as it can restrict the choice of sampling strategy. 
Moreover, serious consideration should be given to the problem of “risk 
framing” (Henwood et al. 2008) when developing interview questions or 
survey questionnaires.  
Research on risk perception could benefit from a more interdisciplinary 
approach.  For instance, it could be a good idea to combine the psychometric 
paradigm and the relational theory of risk in another case study investigating 
perceptions of organizational risk. This would allow researchers to compare 
quantitative data from questionnaires and psychological scales with interview-
based qualitative data obtained from the same research setting. Conversely, it 
would be interesting to adopt the individual employee and the organization as 
units of analysis. In this way, researchers could examine how situational 
factors (e.g. immediate working context, functional area, hierarchical level) 
and institutional pressures driven by legitimacy concerns interact in shaping 
employees’ perceptions of risk. 
These are some of the possible avenues for future research, since as Aven and 
Renn (2010:v) remind us, “[t]here are more questions than answers when 
people talk about risks.”  
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APPENDICES 
A. Interview guide 
OPENING THE INTERVIEW: 
 Thank employee for participating in the study.  
 Brief explanation: objective of the research project, duration of 
interview, confidentiality, rights to withdraw and refuse answering 
questions, and permission for recording the interview.  
 Opportunity for participant to ask questions. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
1. Respondent (number/ID): 
2. Gender: 
3. Educational/professional background: 
4. Area/position in SCN:  
5. Working for SCN since when: 
DEFINITION OF RISK:        
1. What do you understand by the term “risk”?  
2. What is “risk management” to you? Do you believe that risk can be 
managed? Are there limits to managing risks? 
3. In your opinion, what is the importance of managing risks in an 
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organization like SCN? 
RISK PERCEPTION: 
1. What would you describe as the main risks for SCN as an 
organization? Could you provide examples? 
2. What do you consider the key areas in which SCN is exposed to risk? 
Could you provide examples? 
MANAGING RISK:  
1. Can you describe how do you handle these risks? Can you provide an 
example?   
ATTITUDES TOWARDS RISK: 
1. In your opinion, are there any conditions or situations in which NGOs 
should: Take risks? Avoid taking risks? What are the critical 
determinants in each case? 
2. Observing other staff members who are your superiors, peers or 
subordinates, which attitude towards risk do you feel is more common 
in SCN’s management: taking risks, or avoiding them? 
CONCLUDING THE INTERVIEW: 
1. Do you feel that all the topics concerning this study that are important 
for you have been discussed? 
2. Are there any other comments you would like to make concerning the 
study? 
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B. Non-disclosure agreements 
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